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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This paper discusses the regulation of political lobbyists as at 2 June 2008. It takes a 
comparative approach, looking at current and proposed schemes in Australia and in 
selected overseas jurisdictions. It asks what is the best and most effective regulatory 
scheme to safeguard and nurture confidence in the democratic system? 
 
Definition: By ‘lobbying’ is meant the attempt to influence decision makers into choosing 
a course of action preferred by the lobbyist or his client. It may be to pass or amend certain 
legislation, or to oppose its passage through Parliament. It may be to oppose, adopt or 
amend a government policy, or to influence the awarding of a government contract, or the 
allocation of funding. [1] 
 
Issues: While lobbying is undoubtedly a ‘legitimate activity’, there is a perception that 
lobbyists can sometimes wield undue influence and that, without appropriate regulation, 
their activities may skew the political decision making process. Two key issues arise: first, 
the effective regulation of lobbyists generally; and secondly the particular concerns relating 
to post-separation employment for Ministers and others, where former public office holders 
are recruited to the lobbying industry. [2] 
 
Questions: One question for the regulation of lobbying is how narrowly or widely to cast 
the net? Are more or less all forms of lobbying and lobbyists to be included under any 
regulatory scheme, or is it to be more focused, perhaps limited to those professional ‘hired 
guns’ who lobby on behalf of their clients? The same applies to lobbying activities. Should 
regulation attempt to capture only communications seeking to influence Ministers, or 
should it extend to such dealings with public servants and all parliamentarians? [3] 
 
Types of regulatory systems: The academic literature identifies three ‘types’ of regulatory 
systems – ‘lowly regulated systems’; ‘medium regulated systems’; and ‘highly regulated 
systems’. A key finding is that ‘Actors in highly regulated systems were more likely to 
agree, compared to actors in lowly regulated systems, that regulations help ensure 
accountability in government’. [4] 
 
United States: The more ‘highly regulated’ systems are found in the US. Statutory schemes 
are in place, federally under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, with strict registration 
and reporting requirements for all professional lobbyists who seek to influence either 
members of the Executive or the Congress. Spending disclosure requirements are also in 
place, as are enforcement mechanisms and criminal penalties for failure to comply with 
reporting requirements. Post-separation or ‘revolving door’ provisions are a further feature 
of US regulatory systems. Federally, a tiered system operates under the Ethics in 
Government Act of 1978 involving lifetime bans on lobbying in some cases, and two or one 
year bans in others. For example, as amended in 2007 the Act places a two-year ban on 
lobbying contacts by former Senators and ‘very senior’ Executive officials. A one-year ban 
continues to apply to former Members of the House of Representatives, elected officers of 
the House, and Senate officers, or senior Senate employees. [5.1] 
 
Canada: A similar statutory approach to the regulation of lobbying operates federally in 
Canada and in several Provinces. Federally, the relevant legislation is the Lobbyists 
  
Registration Act of 1985 (to be renamed the Lobbyist Act). This probably ranks among the 
medium to highly regulated systems. Lobbyists are defined broadly, as is lobbying activity 
to cover Senators and MPs and all persons holding an elected or appointed position with 
the Canadian Government. Enforcement of the regulations is the work of the new 
Commissioner of Lobbying, an independent officer of Parliament. There is a statutory five-
year ban on ‘designated public office holders’ from lobbying (including Ministers and 
senior public servants). Under the Conflict of Interest and Post-employment Code for 
Public Office Holders, Ministers and senior public servants are permanently banned from 
engaging in particular lobbying/advocacy activity. The one area of regulation not provided 
for it seems is that of ‘spending disclosure’. [5.3] 
 
United Kingdom: The Public Administration Select Committee is currently conducting an 
inquiry into the regulation of lobbying. Provision for post-separation employment is made 
under the Ministerial Code of Conduct, which requires Ministers to seek advice from the 
independent Advisory Committee on Business Appointments about positions they wish to 
take up within two-years of leaving office. The system operates on a voluntary basis, but it 
is said to be ‘widely and willingly used’. Published on the Advisory Committee’s website 
are lists of those appointments taken up by Ministers and Crown Servants. [5.5] 
 
Australia: Due to come into full effect on 1 July 2008 is the Commonwealth Government’s 
Lobbying Code of Conduct. This non-statutory scheme probably belongs to either the 
category of ‘lowly regulated’ or ‘medium regulated systems’. Its registration requirements 
are relatively strict, as are its ‘principles of engagement with government representatives’. 
The draft code’s revolving door provisions are also relatively strict. Ministers and 
Parliamentary Secretaries are banned from lobbying for 18 months, while a one-year ban 
applies to retiring Ministerial advisory staff, senior public servants and high-ranking 
Defence Force personnel. On the other hand, a narrow definition of lobbyists applies, 
confined to ‘hired guns’ working on behalf of third party clients. Further, lobbying activity 
directed towards parliamentarians not holding executive office is excluded from the 
scheme. Also, while the registration requirements are relatively strict, they are to be 
enforced by the Cabinet Secretary, not by an independent statutory body. On 14 May 2008 
the Senate referred the Lobbying Code of Conduct to the Finance and Public 
Administration Committee for inquiry and report. [6.1] 
 
Western Australia: The Commonwealth system is based to a significant extent on the 
Contact with Lobbyists Code established in Western Australia in 2006. [6.4] 
 
New South Wales: In 2006 the NSW Premier’s Department issued guidelines for Ministers, 
their staff and public officials in dealing with lobbyists. [6.5] That same year the Code of 
Conduct for Ministers was amended. First, to require Ministers who, while in office, are 
considering an offer of post-separation employment as lobbyists on behalf of third parties 
to obtain advice from the Parliamentary Ethics Adviser where the prospective work relates 
to their portfolio responsibilities. In comparable circumstances, within 12 months of 
leaving office, former Ministers must also obtain advice from the Parliamentary Ethics 
Adviser.[6.6] 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The role and influence of political lobbyists on the democratic process is a source of 
comment and concern in Australia and beyond. While lobbying is undoubtedly a 
‘legitimate activity’ and an ‘important part’ of that process, there is a perception that 
lobbyists can sometimes wield undue influence and that, without appropriate regulation, 
their activities may skew the political decision making process. At stake is the legitimacy 
of that process, which threatens to dissolve when decisions are perceived to arise from 
secret deals made behind closed doors. 
 
By ‘lobbying’ is meant the attempt to influence decision makers into choosing a course of 
action preferred by the lobbyist or his client. It may be to pass or amend certain legislation, 
or to oppose its passage through Parliament. It may be to oppose, adopt or amend a 
government policy, or to influence the awarding of a government contract, or the allocation 
of funding.  
 
In recent times debate has centred on a number of incidents. The lobbying activity of Brian 
Burke, the former Premier of Western Australia, was the subject of inquiry by the Western 
Australian Corruption and Crime Commission. One outcome of its hearings was that four 
Ministers were sacked for their inappropriate contacts with Burke and for breaching 
Cabinet confidentiality.1 Concerns and allegations have also been raised in NSW in recent 
times.2 An ongoing source of concern at Commonwealth and State level is where, soon 
upon leaving office, former high level politicians become employed as lobbyists in areas 
directly relevant to their past responsibilities or portfolios.  
 
In April 2008 the Commonwealth Government released an exposure draft of a Lobbying 
Code of Conduct. This follows developments in Western Australia where, towards the end 
of 2006, a code of conduct for contact between lobbyists and government representatives 
was established, including a Register of Lobbyists. Also in 2006 the NSW Premier’s 
Department issued guidelines for Ministers, their staff and public officials in dealing with 
lobbyists. 
 
The purpose of this paper is not to revisit the incidents that surround the subject of political 
lobbying, nor yet to analyse the practices associated with lobbying in Australia today. It is 
rather to consider the regulation of political lobbyists. In doing so, the paper takes a 
comparative approach, looking at current and proposed schemes in Australia and in 
selected overseas jurisdictions. It asks what is the best and most effective regulatory 
scheme to safeguard and nurture confidence in the democratic system?  
 
                                                 
1  J Warhurst, Behind closed doors: politics, scandals and the lobbying industry, UNSW Press 
2007, p 60. 
2  See for example - A Midalia, ‘Sartor challenged over permissions’, The Australian Financial 
Review, 14 April 2008, p 7; A Stoner, ‘Light on the hill is glint in the developer’s eye’, The 
Newcastle Herald, 16 April 2008, p 9; A Clennell, ‘Secret lobbyists have the Premier’s ear’, 
SMH, 6 November 2007, p 3. 
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2. ISSUES  
 
There is nothing new in the peddling of political influence. A figure like Brian Burke 
would have been as familiar to the 18th century UK Prime Minister Sir Robert Walpole as 
he is to us today. The difference is that the 18th century is acknowledged to be an age of 
jobbery when every political office was known to have its price. The assumption is that we 
have advanced in a number of ways. First, we live now in a popular representative 
democracy and not in some hierarchical society where the important decisions are made by 
a coterie of upper class persons operating by more or less clandestine methods without 
reference to public scrutiny or accountability. It follows that in our democratic system there 
is an expectation of transparency, for open decision-making, at least to the extent that this 
is consistent with effective government. There is, in addition, a demand for ethical 
standards in public life. Decisions are supposed to be made objectively and on merit, 
without reference to private gain or personal interest. Perhaps Walpole and his 
contemporaries would have considered this hopelessly utopian; and, human nature being 
what it is, some may still treat it today with less than absolute seriousness. But there it is. 
We live in an age of crime and corruption commissions, audit offices, codes of conduct and 
all the regulatory paraphernalia that is designed to promote ethical standards in public life. 
We take the ideals that underpin our system of democratic politics seriously enough to 
invest a fortune in time, energy and money on transforming the rhetoric of good 
governance into some semblance of political reality. It may be that imperfections and 
loopholes will always be with us, which is not to say that we should not seek to adopt the 
best available system of regulation. 
 
Transparency and accountability are the watchwords of the age. In this context, there are 
strong grounds for arguing that lobbying should be as open and as subject to meaningful 
scrutiny as any other part of political life. The point is that, if confidence in the system is to 
be safeguarded and nurtured, the decisions made by public officials must be seen to be 
objective and based fairly on established procedures and the merits of each individual case. 
Likewise, if respect is to be accorded to public offices, the perception needs to be countered 
that the knowledge and contacts gained while in office may be exploited for private reward 
soon after retirement from public life. On this issue the ICAC commented in its 1997 
discussion paper Managing Post Separation Employment: 
 
A public official who is still in office, but who is thinking of working as a lobbyist, 
may be tempted to make decisions that favour prospective clients or employers. A 
former public official who is now a lobbyist may be tempted to use information or 
contacts that are not generally available for personal benefit, or to benefit an employer 
or client. Former colleagues may regard the lobbyist as an insider and grant special 
access and therefore give lobbyists an unfair advantage. In the ICAC's opinion, no 
public official should favour any former public official in the course of their duty and 
equality of access should be a feature of all official dealings.3 
 
Politics is a small world. In Australia, at State and federal level, many prominent figures 
                                                 
3  ICAC, Managing Post Separation Employment: Discussion Paper, April 1997 - 
http://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/files/pdf/pub2_25cp1.pdf 
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from both sides of politics have become leading lobbyists. This is as true of former 
politicians as it is of those they employed, as chiefs of staff and in other high-ranking 
positions. 
 
Of course none of that is to say that lobbying is not itself a perfectly legitimate activity. In a 
representative democracy it is only right that individuals and groups should seek to press 
their views on elected officials. A particular argument is that lobbyists have expertise that 
politicians do not have and can influence politicians by strategically sharing their expertise 
with them.4 Such activity is a natural part of the democratic process of communication 
between the governed and the government. Ideas and views of interested parties belong to 
the policy mix from which decisions emerge. More generally, lobbying fits comfortably 
within the pluralist theory of politics which maintains that power in Western society is 
distributed between a wide number of groups. These groups may be trade unions, pressure 
groups, business organizations, and any of a multitude of formal and informal coalitions, all 
of them jostling to have their say on policy issues of interest to them.  
 
But there must be limits. The line between legitimate influence and corruption must be 
clearly drawn. First and foremost legislation and the making of governmental decisions 
must serve, and must be seen to serve, the public and not sectional, commercial or private 
interest. It is said in this respect: 
 
It is oftentimes assumed that regulation of interest group activities offers several 
advantages to the political system. These include increased accountability and 
transparency, as well as diminishing loopholes in the system which would 
otherwise allow for corrupt behaviour. In this regard, schemes to regulate lobbying 
derive from concerns over the democratic deficit, the openness and transparency of 
government, equality of access to public affairs, and the perceived need to manage 
information flows to and from government.5 
 
Three key issues can be identified. First, the effective regulation of lobbyists generally 
must be addressed. Secondly, there are particular issues concerning what the ICAC has 
called post-separation employment for Ministers and others, where former public office 
holders are recruited to the lobbying industry. Thirdly, there is the broad concern that the 
pluralist playing field is far from level, as some groups and organisations are perceived to 
have far more say and influence than others in the decision-making process. Legal or quasi-
legal responses, in the form of ministerial codes of conduct or guidelines, do not as a rule 
attempt to resolve this large and difficult issue. For this reason, it is not dealt with in a 
concerted way in this paper, which is not to undervalue its importance for the broader 
debate. 
 
                                                 
4  NF Campos and F Giovannoni, ‘Lobbying, corruption and political influence’ (2007) 131 
Public Choice 1 at 2. 
5  Raj Chari, Gary Murphy and John Hogan, ‘Regulating lobbyists: a comparative analysis of 
the United States, Canada, Germany and the European Union’ (July-September 2007) 78 
The Political Quarterly 422. 
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3. TYPES OF LOBBYISTS AND LOBBYING ACTIVITY 
 
Political lobbyists come in many shapes and forms. Lobbying is something that big 
business, trade unions and non-government organizations share. They all want to gain the 
ear of government by one means or another. As Professor John Warhurst writes: 
 
Political lobbying is the process by which the non-government sector – business, 
interest groups, representative organisations – seeks to influence government. It is 
an intervention in the policy-making process or in the wider democratic process.6 
 
To achieve these goals, an industry of lobby groups has been created, as varied, as it is 
large.7 As part of this industry there are professional lobbyists, ‘hired guns’, who represent 
organisations or individuals on a third party basis. These undertake lobbying activity on a 
more or less continual basis and for a variety of clients. Other professional lobbyists are 
employed directly to represent a corporation, an organisation or a cause, anything from 
Telstra to the Australian Medical Association, Clubs NSW or the Australian Conservation 
Foundation. This kind of lobbying activity may also be more or less full time. Then there is 
the multitude of individuals and coalitions with an interest in a particular issue, anything 
from the proposed destruction of a heritage site to a change in the criminal law, who may 
come and go from the lobbying scene on an ad hoc basis, as the need dictates. These 
lobbyists may be ordinary members of the public, representatives of community groups 
operating as volunteers at a grass-roots level. Alternatively, they may also be members of 
such a body as the Law Society of NSW with a mandate to argue for or against a proposed 
amendment to the law.  
 
All these might be said to engage in political lobbying at one level or another. Indeed, it is 
argued that the word lobbyists ‘should include anyone trying to influence government 
policy’, be they ‘business associations and leaders, NGOs, trade unions, churches and 
independent fee for service lobbyists’. Warhurst goes further, arguing that the word 
lobbying ‘should also include lobbying not just of ministers but also of public servants and 
parliamentarians’. At the same he acknowledges that this  
 
is a big ask and the task is made more difficult by the fact much lobbying runs side 
by side with the normal operation of parliamentary government in which 
parliamentarians should represent constituents interests.8 
 
The boundary lines around political lobbying are not easy to draw therefore. The same 
might be said of the methods used by lobbyists. There is no one standard or agreed modus 
                                                 
6  Warhurst, n 1, p 9. 
7  For a statistical account of 150 lobby groups see - J Fitzgerald, You can’t expect anything to 
change if you don’t speak up! Lobbying in Australia, Rosenberg Publishing Ltd 2006, 
Appendix 1. 
8  J Warhurst, ‘Limits to reining in the lobbyists’, The Canberra Times, 17 January 2008 - 
http://canberra.yourguide.com.au/news/opinion/opinion/limits-to-reining-in-the-
lobbyists/1163811.html 
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operandi for the lobbyist. Lobbying can be conducted through direct dealing with such 
political institutions as the government and the public service, or indirectly through the 
media, public opinion or the electoral process.9 Warhurst states: 
  
Lobbying has both closed and open connotations. Lobbying can be described as 
insider work; that is, gaining private access to government. NGOs often rely on 
outsider work, that is, public campaigning through speaking out. Those who seek to 
influence government often try to do both. Advocates of each would argue that they 
make for better democracy and public policy. Both are ways of the community 
communicating better with government.10 
 
One question for the regulation of lobbying is how narrowly or widely to cast the net? Are 
more or less all forms of lobbying and lobbyists to be included under any regulatory 
scheme, or is it to be more focused, perhaps limited to those professional ‘hired guns’ who 
lobby on behalf of their clients? In short, are lobbyists to be defined inclusively or 
restrictively? The same applies to lobbying activities. Are all forms to be regulated or only 
the direct, closed encounters with political players and institutions? Even then, should 
regulation attempt to capture only communications seeking to influence Ministers, or 
should it extend to such dealings with public servants and all parliamentarians? 
 
                                                 
9  Warhurst, n 1, p 9. 
10  Warhurst, n 8. 
NSW Parliamentary Library Research Service 
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4. INDEX AND TYPOLOGY OF SCHEMES REGULATING POLITICAL 
LOBBYING 
 
Any actual or proposed regulation of lobbying can be compared with the relevant schemes 
operating in other jurisdictions. The value of this approach is that it allows us to build up a 
picture of different types of regulatory regimes and to measure how strong or weak they 
are. It also establishes an analytical platform from which to consider the perceived 
effectiveness of these different types of systems. 
 
The account presented in this paper is based on work published in The Political Quarterly 
in 2007 by Raj Chari, Gary Murphy and John Hogan, offering a comparative analysis of the 
regulation of lobbyists. They comment in this respect: 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of lobby/interest groups, only four political 
systems in the world have regulations with regard to lobbying activity: the United 
States, Canada, Germany and the European Union (most particularly, the European 
Parliament).11 
 
Chari, Murphy and Hogan used a quantitative index to measure how strong or weak the 
regulations are in each system, which then allowed for the formulation of a classification 
scheme of the different ‘ideal’ types of regulatory environments. They argued that the three 
types are lowly, medium and strongly regulated systems. 
 
4.1 The Center for Public Integrity (CPI) Index 
 
Compiled in 2003, this quantitative index was based on the analysis of the regulatory 
systems in 50 US jurisdictions undertaken by the Center for Public Integrity (CPI). Their 
analysis is referred to as the ‘Hired Guns’ method, which is explained as follows: 
 
‘Hired Guns’ is an analysis of lobby disclosure laws in all 50 states. The Center for 
Public Integrity created a ranking system that assigns a score to each state (with 
lobbying legislation) based on a survey containing a series of questions regarding 
state lobby disclosure. The questions addressed eight key areas of disclosure for 
state lobbyists and the organisations that put them to work: 
• Definition of lobbyist 
• Individual registration 
• Individual spending disclosure 
• Employer spending disclosure 
• Electronic filing 
• Public access (to a registry of lobbyists) 
• Enforcement, and 
• Revolving door provisions (with particular focus on ‘cooling off periods’). 
 
Based on the analysis of the relevant legislation in each jurisdiction, points were assigned 
for each question, with a maximum of 100 points available. A score of 60 points was 
                                                 
11  Chari, Murphy and Hogan, n 5, p 422. 
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deemed a ‘pass’. A full account of both the methodology and the findings can be found at - 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/hiredguns/nationwide.aspx For the moment it is enough to 
say that the State of Washington was the highest scoring jurisdiction with 87 points. For 
example, in relation to questions on the ‘definition of lobbyists’, the definition in 
Washington’s legislation was found to recognize legislative and executive lobbyists, and an 
individual was considered to be a lobbyist and had to register as such no matter how much 
money they made or spent. In terms of ‘enforcement’ requirements, Washington was found 
to have a State auditing authority over lobby registrations and spending reports. In addition, 
there were separate penalties on its books for the late or incomplete filing of a lobby 
registration form or a lobby spending report. Further, a penalty for the late filing of a lobby 
spending report had been levied in the past 12 months. As for ‘revolving door’ provisions, 
Washington was found to have a cooling off period of one year before legislators could 
register as lobbyists.  
 
The Center for Public Integrity also reported that, as at 2003, US federal laws regulating 
lobbying fared rather badly compared to most States, receiving only 36 points on the index. 
According to the Center for Public Integrity: 
 
Though federal laws are often considered more stringent than state laws, this is not 
the case with the federal lobby disclosure law. The Center for Public Integrity 
survey shows that only three states—New Hampshire, Pennsylvania and 
Wyoming—have lobby disclosure rules that are as weak as or weaker than those 
applying to the hired guns registered to lobby Congress.12  
 
Chari, Murphy and Hogan applied the CPI Index to Germany, the EU Parliament and 
relevant Canadian jurisdictions. More detailed consideration of these is presented in a later 
section of this paper, where it is noted that amendments have been made in several areas in 
recent years. For the moment it is enough to say that, with the ‘pass’ mark set at 60, the 
jurisdictions discussed by Chari, Murphy and Hogan were accorded the following 
numerical scores: 
 
• Canada federal 45 
• British Columbia  44 
• Ontario  43 
• Quebec  40 
• Nova Scotia  36 
• Germany  1713 
• EU Parliament  15 
 
                                                 
12  Center for Public Integrity - http://www.publicintegrity.org/hiredguns/report.aspx?aid=167 
Changes to the federal regulation of lobbying in 2007 are discussed in a later section of this 
paper. 
13  As all Lander level legislation was found to be similar to the German federal legislation, only 
the German federal level was reported. 
NSW Parliamentary Library Research Service 
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4.2 Typology of regulatory systems 
 
The new aspect of the work of Chari, Murphy and Hogan is that they use the CPI 
qualitative index to formulate the following ‘ideal types’ of lobbying regulatory systems: 
 
Three Types of Regulatory Systems 
 Lowly regulated 
systems 
Medium regulated 
systems 
Highly regulated 
systems 
Registration and 
reporting regulations
Rules on individual 
registration, but few 
details required 
Rules on individual 
registration; more 
details required 
Rules on individual 
registration are extremely 
rigorous 
Spending disclosure No rules on individual 
spending disclosure; 
or employer spending 
disclosure 
Some regulation on 
individual spending 
disclosure; none on 
employer spending 
disclosure 
Tight regulations on 
individual spending 
disclosure; and employer 
spending disclosure 
Electronic filing Weak online 
registration and 
paperwork required 
Robust system for 
online registration; no 
paperwork necessary 
Robust system for online 
registration; no paperwork 
necessary 
Public access List of lobbyists 
available, but not 
detailed, or updated 
frequently 
List of lobbyists 
available; detailed, and 
updated frequently 
List of lobbyists and their 
spending disclosures 
available; detailed, and 
updated frequently 
Enforcement Little enforcement 
capabilities invested in 
state agency 
In theory, state agency 
possesses enforcement 
capabilities, though 
infrequently used 
State agency can, and does, 
conduct mandatory 
reviews/audits  
Revolving door 
provision  
No cooling-off period 
before former 
legislators can register 
as lobbyists 
There is a cooling-off 
period before former 
legislators can register 
as lobbyists 
There is a cooling-off 
period before former 
legislators can register as 
lobbyists 
 
Omitted from this typology are the considerations relating to the definition of lobbyists and 
any reference to the scope of their operation, in particular whether this extends to 
parliamentarians who do not hold an executive position. The above typology can therefore 
be supplemented as follows: 
 
 Lowly regulated 
systems 
Medium 
regulated systems
Highly regulated 
systems 
Lobbyists defined ‘Hired guns’ lobbying 
for third parties only 
‘Hired guns’; ‘In-
house’ lobbyists 
employed by interest 
groups or 
organisations  
‘Hired guns’; ‘In-house’ 
lobbyists; Persons lobbying 
on own behalf, or working 
for charitable or religious 
groups  
Targets of lobbying 
activity defined 
Members of the 
Executive (Ministers 
and Parliamentary 
Secretaries) and their 
staff only 
Members of the 
Executive and staff; 
Agency heads and 
public 
servants/officers  
Members of the Executive 
and staff; Agency heads and 
public servants/officers; 
Parliamentarians not 
holding executive office 
The regulation of lobbying 
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4.3 ‘Ideal types’ and their impacts 
 
Taking their analysis one step further, Chari, Murphy and Hogan then test to see whether a 
correlation exists between the opinions of leading participants in the lobbying regime and 
the three ‘ideal’ types of regulatory system. Their key finding in this respect was that 
‘Actors in highly regulated systems were more likely to agree, compared to actors in lowly 
regulated systems, that regulations help ensure accountability in government’. 
Nevertheless, it was also found that ‘even in relatively highly regulated systems, if there is 
a “will” there is always a “way” of undermining regulations’. The regulation of lobbying is 
no panacea therefore – ‘if lobbyists and politicians desire to pursue corrupt activities, no 
piece of legislation will prevent them from doing so’. Chari, Murphy and Hogan 
concluded: 
 
Yet, it may be argued that pursuit of lobbying rules may serve as a framework to 
establish a paradigm within which all policy-makers can effectively function. This 
paradigm ultimately promotes the long-term goals of accountability and 
transparency, while it potentially serves as a deterrent, if not an antidote, for corrupt 
practices.14 
 
                                                 
14  Chari, Murphy and Hogan, n 5, p 433. 
NSW Parliamentary Library Research Service 
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5. THE REGULATION OF LOBBYING IN SELECTED OVERSEAS 
JURISDICTIONS 
 
5.1 United States 
 
Overview: At the federal level in US the regulation of lobbying has a long history, 
stretching at least as far back as the 1930s when Congress enacted legislation in response to 
a number of scandals concerning the lobbying of public utility companies and the maritime 
industry.15 Thus, while lobbying is protected by First Amendment rights of speech, 
association and petition, in the interests of transparency legitimate limits have been 
recognised on lobbying activity.16 Federally again, the Lobbying Act 1946 sought to 
‘disclose to the legislators and the public the identity of the principals, representatives and 
the means involved, to make the free play of legislative intent transparent’.17 A major 
limitation of the Act was that it only regulated lobbying of the legislative and not the 
Executive branch of government. It took nearly 50 years for this flawed piece of legislation 
to be replaced by the Lobbying Disclosures Act of 1995.18 In passing the Act, Congress 
found that: 
 
• responsible representative Government requires public awareness of the 
efforts of paid lobbyists to influence the public decision making process in 
both the legislative and executive branches of the Federal Government;  
• existing lobbying disclosure statutes have been ineffective because of 
unclear statutory language, weak administrative and enforcement 
provisions, and an absence of clear guidance as to who is required to 
register and what they are required to disclose; and  
• the effective public disclosure of the identity and extent of the efforts of 
paid lobbyists to influence Federal officials in the conduct of Government 
actions will increase public confidence in the integrity of Government.  
 
Responding to various scandals, including that surrounding the ‘super lobbyist’ Jack 
Abramoff, who built a lobbying empire during the Republican rise to power in Congress in 
the 1990s and expanded his influence when George W Bush became President in 2000, the 
Lobbying Disclosures Act was further tightened by the Honest Leadership and Open 
Government Act of 2007, as were internal House of Representatives and Senate rules on 
such matters as gifts, travel and contacts with lobbyists.  
                                                 
15  Chari, Murphy and Hogan, n 5, p 422. For a comprehensive account of the history of federal 
US legislation up to 2005 see – WV Luneburg and TM Susman, The Lobbying Manual: A 
Complete Guide to Federal Law Governing Lawyers and Lobbyists, 3rd ed, ABA Publishing 
2005. 
16  The Lobbying Disclosures Act of 1995 does not operate to prohibit or interfere with these 
First Amendment rights – 2 US Code 26, s 1607. 
17  Chari, Murphy and Hogan, n 5, p 422. 
18  For the full text see - 2 United States Code 26 - 
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/search/display.html?terms=1603&url=/uscode/html/usc
ode02/usc_sup_01_2_10_26.html 
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The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995:19 This Act is directed at ‘professional lobbyists’, 
by which is meant those who are paid to engage in lobbying activity on behalf of a client or 
an employer. It does not seek to regulate volunteers therefore. What it does regulate are 
both ‘hired guns’ working for third parties and ‘in-house’ lobbyists employed by 
corporation or other clients. The term ‘client’ is defined broadly to mean: 
 
any person or entity that employs or retains another person for financial or other 
compensation to conduct lobbying activities on behalf of that person or entity. A 
person or entity whose employees act as lobbyists on its own behalf is both a client 
and an employer of such employees. In the case of a coalition or association that 
employs or retains other persons to conduct lobbying activities, the client is the 
coalition or association and not its individual members.  
 
Certain exceptions and thresholds apply. For example, organizations that engage in ‘grass 
roots’ lobbying only are not covered. To qualify as a lobbyist, a person must make more 
than one ‘lobbying contact’ and spend at least 20% of his total time for a client/employer 
on lobbying activities over the reporting period.20 There is in addition a de minimis expense 
threshold that be must crossed before an organization or lobbying firm is required to 
register. As part of the ongoing quarterly registration process, ‘hired gun’ lobbyists are 
required to detail the total amount of income received from a client, just as organisations 
employing their own lobbyists are required to submit ‘good faith’ estimates of their total 
lobbying expenses.  
 
Lobbying activity is not defined under the legislation to specifically refer to the attempt to 
influence a public office holder. Rather, any form of communication made on behalf of a 
‘client’ on such matters as the making or amending of Federal legislation, or the 
administration or execution of Federal policy constitutes ‘lobbying contact’ for the 
purposes of the Act.21  
 
A lobbyist or his employer must register within 45 days of making contact. For lobbying 
contact to occur, the key requirement is that the communication must be directed towards 
either a ‘covered executive branch official’ or a ‘covered legislative branch official’. The 
former category includes all executive officials from the President, to more senior members 
of the armed forces and down to ‘any officer or employee serving in a position of a 
confidential, policy-determining, policy-making, or policy-advocating character’. The latter 
category includes Members of Congress and their staff, as well as the officers and senior 
                                                 
19  For an overview of the legislation prior to the 2007 amendment see – J Maskell, Lobbying 
Congress: an overview of legal provisions and Congressional ethics rules, Congressional 
Research Service, 27 December 2006. For an overview of the 2007 amendments see – J 
Maskell, Lobbying law and ethics rules changes in the 110th Congress, Congressional 
Research Service, 7 September 2007. 
20  The 2007 amendments to the law introduced quarterly instead of semi-annual reporting 
conditions and the time and expenditure thresholds have been altered to reflect this change. 
21  Various exceptions are set out in 2 United States Code 26, s 1606 (8)(B). These include a 
communication ‘made by a public official acting in the public official’s official capacity’. 
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employees of the Congress.22 
 
Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007:23 This Act amended a wide 
range of statutes and rules applying to such integrity related matters as donations to 
campaign funding. It also amended the lobbying disclosure scheme in specific ways, 
including: extending the scheme’s ‘revolving door’ provisions; and increasing the penalties 
for wrongdoing.  
 
Penalties: On this last issue, failure to comply with a provision of the Lobbying Disclosure 
Act was increased to a civil penalty of up to $200,000. A specific criminal penalty was also 
added for knowing and corrupt failure to comply, an offence carrying a penalty of 
imprisonment of up to 5 years and/or a fine. 
 
Revolving door provisions: Post-separation employment or ‘revolving door’ provisions as 
they are often called in the US were also revisited in the 2007 Act. These are located under 
the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (18 US Code 207) and contain both specific and 
more general prohibitions. Specifically, this legislation introduced limitations on the future 
employment of members of executive government, including office holders equivalent to 
Ministers. These prohibitions principally target lobbying and advocacy and include:  
 
• a permanent restriction on lobbying or advocacy in transactions in which the 
government is a party and the official ‘participated personally and substantially’ 
while in office; and  
• a two-year restriction on lobbying or advocacy in transactions in which the 
government is a party and the official ‘knows or reasonably should know was 
actually pending under his or her official responsibility’ in the last year of his or her 
office.24 
 
In addition, a general one-year prohibition or ‘cooling off’ period was in place for top 
officials, whereby they could not ‘lobby’ or make communications with intent to influence 
someone in their former department or agency. These rules were partially amended in 
2007, extending from one to two years the ban on lobbying contacts by former Senators and 
‘very senior’ Executive officials (substantially, the Vice President, Cabinet level officials, 
and certain top White House aides). The 2007 Act continued the general one-year ban on 
lobbying contacts by former: Members of the House of Representatives; elected officers of 
the House; and Senate officers, or senior Senate employees. 
 
                                                 
22  As defined by s 109(13) of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. 
23  For the full text of the Act see - http://www.opencongress.org/bill/110-s1/show 
24  ICAC, n 73, p 74.The penalties for breach are imprisonment for one year or a fine or both. If 
the conduct is willful, the penalty is five years’ imprisonment or a fine or both. The 
restrictions can be waived by the President or the Office of Government Ethics on certain 
conditions. For the full text of the legislation see - 
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/search/display.html?terms=207&url=/uscode/html/usco
de18/usc_sec_18_00000207----000-.html 
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Electronic filing: The 2007 Act further requires lobbying reports to be filed electronically 
by registrants, in addition to any other form the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the 
House may require. 
 
Offering gifts or travel to Members or employees of Congress: The Lobbying Disclosures 
Act was amended to expressly prohibit registered lobbyists and other relevant persons and 
organisations from ‘making a gift or providing travel’ to a ‘covered legislative branch 
official’ (Members of Congress, their staff etc) if it is known that the gift or travel offered 
may not be accepted under the rules of the House or the Senate. Senate and House rules 
have also been amended, for example, to prohibit gifts under $50 from lobbyists. The 2007 
amendments also prohibited a registered lobbyist from paying for a Member’s or staffer’s 
expenses for ‘officially connected travel’.25 
 
As amended in 2007, the key components of the US federal scheme can be set out as 
follows: 
 
Registration and 
reporting regulations 
• Names, address etc of lobbyists and clients, with description of 
their business or activities 
• Statement of areas where lobbyists will be active and of specific 
issues already addressed by lobbying activity 
• Names of employees of lobbying firms and whether any have 
served in Executive or Legislative branches in last 2 years 
• Quarterly updates of lobbyist’s details 
Spending disclosure • Disclosure by lobbying firms of ‘good faith estimate’ of total 
income from client; organisations with ‘in house’ lobbyists to 
submit ‘good faith’ estimates of their total lobbying expenses 
Electronic filing • Yes 
Public access • Public document available on websites of Clerk of the House and 
Secretary of the Senate 
Enforcement • Statutory oversight by Clerk of the House and Secretary of the 
Senate 
• Aggregate number of referrals of non-compliance made public. 
• Referral of non-compliance to US Attorney General 
• Attorney General to report to relevant House of Senate 
Committee on aggregate number of enforcement actions taken by 
Department of Justice, and any sentence imposed. Identity of 
persons not already a matter of public record not disclosed. 
Revolving door 
provisions 
• Specific restrictions on high level Executive officers and 
employees from engaging in particular lobbying/advocacy 
activity 
• Two year ban on ‘very senior’ Executive officials (the Vice 
President, Cabinet level officials, and certain top White House 
aides) lobbying former department; two year ban on former 
Senators 
                                                 
25  J Maskell, Lobbying law and ethics rules changes in the 110th Congress, Congressional 
Research Service, 7 September 2007. 
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• One year ban on House Members, elected officers of the House 
and Senate officials and senior employees  
Lobbyists defined • ‘Hired’ guns’ employed by third party to lobby on their behalf 
• ‘In-house’ lobbyists employed by companies and organisations 
Targets of lobbying 
activity defined’ 
• ‘Covered executive branch officials’ (members of the Executive, 
senior Executive staff and senior members of armed forces); and 
‘covered legislative branch officials’ (Members of Congress and 
staff, plus officers and senior employees of the Congress). 
 
Comment: By the standards set by the Center for Public Integrity this post-2007 regulatory 
regime may still leave room for improvement. As noted, in its quantitative index of 2003 
the Center for Public Integrity gave the federal laws 36 points, where the pass mark was 60. 
Significant reform has been introduced since that time, requiring electronic filing and other 
measures. Nonetheless, the following comments from the Center for Public Integrity would 
still appear relevant 
 
• A federal lobbyist is not required to register until 45 days after they begin 
performing activities that constitute lobbying or have been contracted to perform 
lobbying activities. Lobbyists in 20 States are required to register before 
performing any activities constituting lobbying; in another 17 states lobbyists must 
register within one to 5 days of lobbying.  
• A federal lobbyist files spending reports quarterly (twice a year before the 2007 
Act). Lobbyists in 12 states file monthly spending reports.  
• The spending report does not require aggregate totals categorized by type of 
spending, unlike the spending reports in 31 States that do sum up expenses by gifts, 
postage, meals, entertainment, etc.  
• The spending report does not require any detailed itemization of spending, unlike 
the spending reports in 37 States which require some individual information for 
each expense.26 
 
5.2 US States 
 
As reported in the 2002 survey conducted by the Center for Ethics in Government of the 
National Conference of State Legislatures, legislation regulating lobbying exists in all 50 
US States. The survey found that in at least 20 States lobbyists and/or their employers had 
to report the legislative and administrative actions they lobbied for and against. Lobbyists 
in these States had to either report such action by subject area or individually with the name 
of each bill, resolution or other legislative activity that the lobbyist engaged in supporting 
or opposing. Examples from the 2002 survey of States that require lobbyists to disclose 
such actions included: 
                                                 
26  Center for Public Integrity - http://www.publicintegrity.org/hiredguns/report.aspx?aid=167 
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Alabama Lobbyists must file a list of legislation by category supported or opposed
California Lobbying firms must report, for each client, each bill or administrative 
action with regard to which someone in the firm engaged in direct 
communication 
Idaho Lobbyists must report the subject of proposed legislation and the number 
of each Senate or House bill, resolution or other legislative activity that 
the lobbyist has been engaged in supporting or opposing. For 
appropriation bills, lobbyists must enumerate specific section(s) 
supported or opposed 
Massachusetts Lobbyist reports must include all bill numbers of legislation the lobbyist 
acted to promote, oppose or influence 
 
Some detail on the scheme in place in Washington State was provided in an earlier section 
of this paper. As noted, Washington scored best in the Center for Public Integrity’s 2003 
quantitative index, with a score of 87. The scale of lobbying activity is suggested by the 
following figures.27 
 
 Total As Of 
Lobby Spending $37,049,691 2005 
No. of Registered Lobbyists 872 2005 
No. of Lobbyist Employers 1161 2005 
Ratio of Lobbyists to Legislators 6 to 1 2005 
 
More of a mid-range performer on the Center for Public Integrity’s quantitative index, with 
a score of 67, was Ohio. One feature of its regulatory scheme is that a one-year post-
separation employment ban on lobbying is in place for all State legislators. As of 2005, it is 
reported that 36 former Ohio legislators had become lobbyists at the State level. An 
overview of the regulatory system in Ohio is presented in the 2007 Lobbying Handbook 
produced by the Office of the Legislative Inspector General - http://www.jlec-
olig.state.oh.us/HANDBOOK/2007Handbook.pdf. Legislative and Executive lobbyists 
must update their registration statements three times a year. Required is an updated 
registration statement by lobbyists and their employers, for which four types of basic 
information must be disclosed:  
 
• confirmation of the continuing existence of each engagement described in an Initial 
Registration Statement;  
• a list of the specific bill(s) or resolution(s), executive agency decision(s) or retirement 
system decision(s) that the lobbyist sought to influence under the engagement during 
the period covered by the Updated Registration Statement;  
• a statement of expenditures; and  
• details of any financial transactions. 
 
Details on the scale of lobbying activity in Ohio are suggested by the following figures:28 
                                                 
27  Center for Public Integrity - http://www.publicintegrity.org/hiredguns/iys.aspx?st=WA 
28  Center for Public Integrity - http://www.publicintegrity.org/hiredguns/iys.aspx?st=OH 
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 Total As Of 
Lobby Spending $599,498 2005 
No. of Registered Lobbyists 1388 2005 
No. of Lobbyist Employers 1264 2005 
Ratio of Lobbyists to Legislators 11 to 1 2005 
 
Details on lobbying activity in other US States are set out in the Center for Public 
Integrity’s table State Lobbying Totals, 2004-2006. This is reproduced at Appendix A to 
this paper.29  
 
5.3 Canada 
 
Overview: At the federal level, legislation regulating lobbying was introduced in Canada 
under the Lobbyists Registration Act of 1985 (which only came into force in 1989). This 
was amended in 1995, then again in 2003 and subsequently in 2006, under the Federal 
Accountability Act. Under this last omnibus piece of legislation the Lobbyists Registration 
Act is to be renamed the Lobbyist Act. As yet, with the exception of the post-separation 
employment rules, the relevant provisions have not been proclaimed to commence. 
However, the amendments made by the 2006 legislation are likely to be in force in the very 
near future and it is on this assumption that this account of the regulation of lobbying in 
Canada is written.  
 
An added element to the regulatory scheme is the Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct, which came 
into force in 1997 and is designed to  
 
assure the Canadian public that lobbying is done ethically and with the highest 
standards, with a view to conserving and enhancing public confidence and trust in 
the integrity, objectivity and impartiality of government decision-making.30 
 
At present the regulatory scheme is administered and enforced by the Office of the 
Registrar of Lobbyists. However, under the Federal Accountability Act a Commissioner of 
Lobbying is to be established as an independent officer of the Canadian Parliament.31  
 
                                                 
29  It can also be accessed at – 
 http://www.publicintegrity.org/hiredguns/chart.aspx?act=lobbyspending 
30  Office of the Registrar of Lobbyists – http://www.orl-bdl.gc.ca/epic/site/lobbyist-
lobbyiste.nsf/en/nx00230e.html - Purpose-description-code The Code is not affected by the 
Federal Accountability Act. 
31  This account is based on the Canadian Office of the Registrar of Lobbyists website - 
http://www.orl-bdl.gc.ca/epic/site/lobbyist-lobbyiste.nsf/en/nx00230e.html - Lobbying-
activities 
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Lobbyists Registration Act: The Lobbyists Registration Act is based on four key 
principles: 
 
• free and open access to government is an important matter of public interest; 
• lobbying public office holders is a legitimate activity; 
• that public office holders and the public are able to know who is attempting to 
influence government is desirable; and 
• a system of registration of paid lobbyists should not impede free and open access to 
government. 
 
Taking a broad and inclusive approach, the Act applies to those who lobby on behalf of 
trade unions and charity and religious organisations are included. Identified are three types 
of lobbyist: 
 
• Consultant lobbyists — individuals, such as lawyers, accountants and government 
relations consultants, who are paid to lobby for clients; 
• In-house lobbyists for corporations — employees who, as a significant part of their 
duties, lobby for an employer who carries out commercial activities for financial 
gain; and 
• In-house lobbyists for organizations — not-for-profit organizations in which one or 
more employees lobby, and the collective time devoted to lobbying amounts to a 
significant part of one employee's duties. 
 
The targets of lobbying are defined as Public Office Holders (POHs) and again an inclusive 
approach is adopted. Public Office Holders are defined in the Act as virtually all persons 
occupying an elected or appointed position in the Government of Canada, including 
members of the House of Commons and the Senate and their staff, as well as officers and 
employees of federal departments and agencies, members of the Canadian Forces and 
members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.  
 
Under the Act, individuals must be registered if they communicate with federal Public 
Office Holders, whether formally or informally, with regard to: 
 
• the making, developing or amending of federal legislative proposals, bills or 
resolutions, regulations, policies or programs; or  
• the awarding of federal grants, contributions or other financial benefits; and  
• in the case of consultant lobbyists, the awarding of a federal government contract 
and arranging a meeting between their client and a POH.  
 
An exception is made for persons making only simple enquiries or requests for information, 
or for such activities as making submissions to a parliamentary committee.  
 
Consistent with the US approach, a feature of the Canadian federal legislation is that its 
definition of lobbying does not refer to the attempt to ‘influence’ public office holders. 
Rather, its conception of lobbying activity encompasses all forms of communication with 
public office holders in defined contexts, such as the development of legislation, the 
passage of a Bill through Parliament, the making of policy or the granting of a government 
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contract. It seems that for lobbying activity to occur, the lobbyist must not attempt to 
influence a Minister, Member of Parliament or public servant for his work to be identified 
as lobbying, only to communicate with a public office holder, in a professional capacity as 
either a consultant lobbyist, or an ‘in-house’ lobbyist for a corporation or an organization.32 
 
The Federal Accountability Act: The Federal Accountability Act amended 46 existing 
statutes and created two new ones. As noted, with the exception of the five-year post-
separation employment prohibition on Ministers and others, which came into force upon 
Royal Assent, the rest of the provisions relating to lobbying have not yet come into force. 
 
The Federal Accountability Act amends the Lobbyists Registration Act in eight major ways: 
 
• identifying a new category of key decision-maker within government called 
‘designated public office holder’ which includes ministers, ministers of state and 
their exempt staff, deputy heads, associate deputy heads and assistant deputy 
ministers and equivalent ranks throughout the public service;  
• prior to these reforms, section 29(1) of the Conflict of Interest and Post-
Employment Code for Public Office Holders provided that former ministers, senior 
public servants and designated ministerial staff could not act as consultant 
lobbyists, or accept employment as in-house lobbyists, for a period of five years 
after leaving public office. Although public office holders were bound by their 
obligations under the Code, the Code did not have the force of law. This has been 
remedied under the new legislative requirements which impose a statutory five-year 
post-employment prohibition on ‘designated public office holders’, including 
Ministers, ministerial staffers-and individuals identified by the Prime Minister as 
being members of his or her transition team from becoming registered lobbyists 
once they have left office.33 Note, too, that under section 27(1) of the Conflict of 
Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office Holders public office holders 
are permanently banned from ‘switching sides’ in any ‘specific ongoing 
proceeding, transaction, negotiation or case to which the Government is a party and 
where the former public office holder acted for or advised the Government’.34 
• requiring lobbyists to register on a monthly basis certain types of communications 
with ‘designated public office holders’, including with whom they met, when, and 
on what subject, plus any other information that may be prescribed by regulation, in 
additon, the type of communication for which monthly returns will be required will 
be set out in regulations;  
• banning the payment of contingency fees to consultant lobbyists;  
                                                 
32  The federal Act was amended in 2003 to remove the expression ‘in an attempt to influence’.  
 
33  Designated public office holders can apply for an exemption from the new Commissioner of 
Lobbying where, for example, the person was a designated public office holder for a short 
period or only in an acting capacity. 
 
34  For the full text of the Code see - http://www.parl.gc.ca/ciec-
ccie/en/archives/ethics_commissioner/conflicts/docs/code_e.pdf 
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• extending from two to 10 years the period during which possible infractions or 
violations under the Lobbying Act may be investigated and prosecution may be 
initiated. Within this 10-year period, the Commissioner will have to complete 
investigations within five years of becoming aware of the possible infraction or 
violation.  
• doubling the criminal monetary penalties for lobbyists who fail to comply with the 
requirements of the Lobbying Act. Thus, where an individual fails to file a return, or 
knowingly makes any false or misleading statement, they may be liable to a fine of 
$50,000 and/or imprisonment for 6 months (if prosecuted summarily), or to a fine 
of $200,000 and/or imprisonment for 2 years (if prosecuted on indictment);  
• replacing the Registrar of Lobbyists with the Office of the Commissioner of 
Lobbying, an independent officer of Parliament. The Commissioner of Lobbying is 
to be appointed by the Governor, after consultation with the leader of every 
recognized party in the Senate and the House of Commons and after approval of the 
appointment by resolution of the Senate and the House of Commons. He or she 
holds office for a seven-year term. An advertisement for the new position was 
published in the Canada Gazette on January 19, 2008; and 
• enhancing the investigative powers and mandate of the Commissioner of Lobbying.  
 
The Commissioner will be able to: 
 
• ask ‘designated public office holders’ to verify the accuracy and 
completeness of information pertaining to them in monthly reports that 
lobbyists submit, to correct it if necessary and display that information in 
the registry; the Commissioner is required to report to Parliament the names 
of ‘designated public office holders’ who do not respond to this request;  
• conduct expanded investigations, including the power to summon and 
compel persons to produce documents relevant to any investigation of 
possible infractions under the Lobbying Act or the Lobbyists' Code of 
Conduct;  
• prohibit any lobbyist convicted of any offence from communicating with 
the federal government as a paid lobbyist for up to two years, if the 
Commissioner deems it to be in the public interest;  
• publish the names of violators in reports tabled before Parliament; and  
• undertake expanded outreach, education, and communications activities 
with the public, lobbyists and their clients, and public office holders to 
foster understanding and awareness of the requirements.  
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Assuming all these amendments will come into force, the key components of the Canadian 
federal scheme can be set out as follows: 
 
Registration and 
reporting regulations 
• Names, business address of lobbyists and employers 
• Identify whether lobbyist was a public office holder; also whether 
they were a designated POH and if so, the date on which they 
ceased to hold that office. 
• Names of their clients, or corporate or organizational employers 
• Names of parent or subsidiary companies that would benefit from 
the lobbying activity 
• Organisational members of coalition groups 
• Specific subject matters of lobbying 
• Names of the federal departments or agencies contacted 
• Sources and amounts of any government funding received 
• Communication techniques uses, such as meetings, telephone 
calls or grass-roots lobbying 
• Six monthly updates; but monthly updates of certain types of 
communications with ‘designated public office holders’ 
Spending disclosure • None 
Electronic filing • Yes 
Public access • Public document available on website of Office of the 
Commissioner of Lobbying 
Enforcement • Independent statutory oversight body 
• Register policed by Commissioner of Lobbying 
• Broad powers to investigate, publicize and prohibit offenders 
from engaging in lobbying activity 
• 10 year statutory limit on investigation of possible infractions 
• Fine of $50,000 and/or imprisonment for 6 months (if prosecuted 
summarily), fine of $200,000 and/or imprisonment for 2 years (if 
prosecuted on indictment) 
Revolving door 
provisions 
• Specific non-statutory lifelong ban on former public office 
holders (including Ministers and senior public servants) from 
engaging in particular lobbying/advocacy activity 
• Five year statutory ban on ‘designated public office holders’ from 
lobbying (including Ministers and senior public servants) 
Lobbyists defined • Consultant lobbyists; also ‘in-house’ lobbyists for corporations 
and not for profit organisations and others 
Targets of lobbying 
activity defined 
• Communications with Public Office Holders – Senators/MPs and 
all persons holding an elected or appointed position with the 
Canadian Government  
 
Comment: In terms of the ‘ideal types; of regulatory systems, outlined in the previous 
section of this paper, the Canadian federal system would probably rank in the medium to 
highly regulated systems. The one area of regulation not provided for it seems is that of 
‘spending disclosure’, either for individual lobbyists or their employers. Otherwise, the 
Canadian federal regime ticks all the boxes, with provision made for the online filing of 
details, full access to the public to the register and the publication of statistical breakdowns 
on the number of different categories of lobbyists. Offering an insight into the scale of the 
lobbying industry in Canada, the Office of the Registrar of Lobbyists reported that in 2006-
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07 there were a total of 5,281 registered individual lobbyists. The number of active 
individual lobbyists can be broken down further, as follows:35 
 
 2006-07 2005-06 
Consultant lobbyists 860 732 
In-house lobbyists (corporations) 1,882 1,809 
In-house lobbyists (organisations) 2,539 2,306 
 
With consultant lobbyists required to file one registration for each client, the Office of the 
Registrar of Lobbyists further reported that: 
 
During fiscal year 2006-2007, 9,656 registrations were processed, of which 7,775 
were consultant lobbyist registrations, 793 were in-house lobbyist (corporations) 
registrations and 1,088 were in-house lobbyist (organizations) registrations. In 
2005-2006, 6,994 registrations had been processed, including 5,347 consultant 
lobbyists registrations, 617 in-house lobbyist (corporations) registrations and 1,030 
in-house lobbyist (organizations) registrations. This represents a global increase of 
38 percent for all three categories of lobbyists. For each type of lobbyist, the year-
over-year increases were of 45 percent for consultant lobbyists, 29 percent for in-
house lobbyists (corporations) and 6 percent for in-house lobbyists 
(organizations).36 
 
5.4 Canadian Provinces 
 
Similar legislation for the regulation of political lobbyists operates in several Canadian 
Provinces, notably Nova Scotia,37 Quebec,38 Ontario,39 British Columbia40 Newfoundland41 
and most recently Alberta.42  
 
By way of example, Newfoundland’s Lobbyist Registration Act was passed in 2004, with 
                                                 
35  Office of the Registrar of Lobbyists - http://www.orl-bdl.gc.ca/epic/site/lobbyist-
lobbyiste.nsf/en/nx00230e.html - Purpose-description-code 
36  Office of the Registrar of Lobbyists - http://www.orl-bdl.gc.ca/epic/site/lobbyist-
lobbyiste.nsf/en/nx00230e.html - Statistical-review 
37  Lobbyists’ Registration Act 2001 - http://www.canlii.org/ns/laws/sta/2001c.34/index.html 
38  Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Act - http://www.canlii.org/qc/laws/sta/t-
11.011/20080415/whole.html 
39  Lobbyists Registration Act 1998 - http://www.canlii.org/on/laws/sta/1998c.27sch./index.html 
40  Lobbyists Registration Act 2001 - http://www.qp.gov.bc.ca/statreg/stat/L/01042_01.htm 
41  The Act was proclaimed to commence on 11 October 2005. For the text of the legislation 
see - http://assembly.nl.ca/Legislation/sr/statutes/l24-1.htm - 31_ 
42  The Alberta Lobbyists Act of 2007 is currently awaiting proclamation - 
http://www.canlii.org/ab/laws/sta/l-20.5/20080415/whole.html 
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the first Commissioner for Lobbying being appointed a year later. A Government media 
release explained: 
 
Under the Act, paid lobbyists are required to file reports on their specific lobbying 
objectives and activities in the Newfoundland and Labrador Registry of Lobbyists. 
The Act defines two categories of lobbyists: consultant lobbyists and in-house 
lobbyists. Consultant lobbyists are paid to lobby on behalf of client companies, 
organizations and individuals. In-house lobbyists are employees who lobby on 
behalf of their organizations. To qualify as an in-house lobbyist, an employee’s 
lobbying activities, alone or combined with other employees, must occupy 20 per 
cent or more of one staff member’s full-time work. The Act also establishes a Code 
of Conduct for lobbyists and imposes significant penalties for offences and 
violations. The Commissioner of Lobbyists will oversee compliance with the Act 
and Code of Conduct, and the Registry of Lobbyists will be administered by a 
registrar.43 
 
Basically, the Act deals with the lobbying of ‘public office holders’, as term that is defined 
broadly to include Members of the Newfoundland House of Assembly and their staff, as 
well public servants and such public office holders as members of a hospital board. 
Lobbyists include a wide range of ‘organisations’, among them trade unions and not for 
profit and charitable organisations. The word ‘lobby’ is also given a relatively broad ambit, 
to include communications ‘with a public office holder for remuneration or other gain, 
reward or benefit, in an attempt to influence’ the making or amending of legislation or 
subordinate legislation, the awarding of a grant or contract, the appointment of any public 
official, or the procurement of goods and service by a public official. 
 
5.5 United Kingdom 
 
Current inquiry into lobbying: The Public Administration Select Committee is currently 
conducting an inquiry into the regulation of lobbying. It reports that, at present, multi-client 
public affairs companies are not subject to external regulation. The Public Relations 
Consultants Association was set up in 1969, and maintains a membership directory and 
various codes of conduct. Additionally, eighty per cent of lobby firms belong to the 
Association of Professional Political Consultants which was established in response to the 
‘cash for questions’ scandal of the early 1990s. This requires organisations to list the names 
of their clients as well as their consultancy staff. The Public Administration Select 
Committee adds that some have suggested that firms will only register if it is in their 
commercial interests to do so.  
 
Questions have been raised over the effectiveness of the content of the code. There 
has also been some criticism that some of the firms employed by public sector 
bodies are not members of the APPC and do not list their clients names in full.44  
                                                 
43  Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, ‘First Commissioner of Lobbyists appointed’, 
Media Release - http://www.releases.gov.nl.ca/releases/2005/exec/1005n04.htm 
44  Public Administration Select Committee, Lobbyists, access and influence: background 
issues and questions  - http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/Lobbying IQ paper.pdf 
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Nonetheless, in 1995 the First Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life 
welcomed self-regulation of the industry and its Sixth Report in 2000 also rejected outside 
regulation of the industry. Instead it recommended: 
 
To allay suspicions that some external interests including lobbyists have had 
privileged access to government, the Committee recommends that Ministers and 
civil servants should be required to keep a record of contacts with outside interests. 
A code to improve the transparency of government consultation exercises is also 
recommended.45  
 
Post-separation employment: As for ‘revolving door’ provisions, as at July 2007 the 
Ministerial Code of Conduct states: 
 
On leaving office, Ministers must seek advice from the independent Advisory 
Committee on Business Appointments about any appointments or employment they 
wish to take up within two years of leaving office, apart from unpaid appointments 
in non-commercial organisations. Ministers will be expected to abide by the advice 
of the Committee.46 
 
The work of the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACBA) is an 
independent non-departmental public body sponsored by the Cabinet Office, with 7 
members appointed by the Prime Minister.  They have a very broad remit to approve not 
only outside appointments taken up by Ministers, but also to apply rules that apply to the 
most senior members of the Civil Service, the Armed forces and the Diplomatic Service. 
The Advisory Committee’s Guidelines on the acceptance of appointments or employment 
outside Government by former Ministers of the Crown states: 
 
The Advisory Committee will consider each appointment on its merits, against 
specific tests relating to the following: 
 
 to what extent, if at all, has the former Minister been in a position which 
could lay him or her open to the suggestion that the appointment was in 
some way a reward for past favours? 
 has the former Minister been in a position where he or she has had 
access to trade secrets of competitors or knowledge of unannounced 
Government policy which would give his or her company an unfair 
advantage?47  
                                                 
45  Sixth Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, 2000 - http://www.public-
standards.gov.uk/publications/6th_report.aspx 
46  Cabinet Office, Ministerial Code: a code of ethics and procedural guidance for Ministers, 
July 2007 - 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/propriety_and_ethics/ministers/ministerial_code.aspx 
47  Advisory Committee on Business Appointments - 
http://www.acoba.gov.uk/~/media/assets/www.acoba.gov.uk/guidelines pdf.ashx 
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The system operates on a voluntary basis, but it is said to be ‘widely and willingly used’.48 
All approaches to the Advisory Committee are confidential and advice is not made public 
unless the appointment is taken up. Published on the Advisory Committee’s website are 
lists of those appointments taken up by Ministers and Crown Servants. These are updated 
on a monthly basis and indicate where one or two Committee members dissented from the 
advice given.49 
 
 
                                                 
48  ACBA, Third Report 1999-2000, p 11. 
49  ACBA - http://www.acoba.gov.uk/~/media/assets/www.acoba.gov.uk/guidelines pdf.ashx 
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6. THE REGULATION OF LOBBYING IN AUSTRALIA 
 
6.1 Commonwealth – Lobbying Code of Conduct 
 
With this analytical framework in place, proposed and existing schemes for the regulation 
of political lobbying can be looked at in more detail, starting with the release by the Special 
Minister of State Senator John Faulkner in April 2008 of the Australian Commonwealth 
Government’s exposure draft of a Lobbying Code of Conduct. Its key components can be 
set out as follows: 
 
Registration and 
reporting regulations 
• Business registration details of lobbyist, including 
owners/partners/major shareholders where the business is not a 
publicly listed company 
• Names and positions of persons engaged to carry out lobbying 
activities 
• Names of clients 
• Quarterly updates of lobbyist’s details 
• Registration lapses if details not supplied within 10 days of 
quarterly deadlines 
• Statutory declaration that lobbyist never sentenced to 30 months 
or more imprisonment or convicted in last 10 years of theft, fraud 
or other dishonesty offence 
Spending disclosure • None 
Electronic filing • Yes 
Public access • Public document available on website of Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 
Enforcement • No independent statutory oversight body 
• Register policed by Cabinet Secretary 
• Cabinet Secretary has general power – exercised in his/her 
absolute discretion – to refuse registration or remove lobbying 
business or an individual from Register 
• Specifically, the Secretary may remove lobbyists from Register if 
he/she is of the opinion that: conduct has contravened the terms of 
the Code; registration details are inaccurate; lobbyist fails to 
answer relevant questions in reasonable time; or where 
registration requirements have not been fulfilled 
• Conduct is to be measured against ‘principles of engagement with 
government representatives’ 
• Government representatives must report breaches of the Code to 
the Secretary 
Revolving door 
provisions 
• After 1 May 2008, retiring Ministers and Parliamentary 
Secretaries banned from lobbying for 18 months 
• After 1 May 2008, retiring Ministerial advisory staff, Senior 
Public Servants and high ranking Defence Force personnel 
banned from lobbying for 12 months 
Lobbyists defined • ‘Hired guns’ employed by third party to lobby on their behalf 
Targets of lobbying 
activity defined 
• Communication intending to influence members of the Executive 
(Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries) and staff; Agency heads 
and public servants/officers (including defence force personnel)
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The model for the Commonwealth code is the Western Australian Contact with Lobbyists 
Code, established in 2006.As set out above, the Commonweath Lobbying Code of Conduct 
probably belongs to either the category of ‘lowly regulated’ or ‘medium regulated 
systems’.50 Its registration requirements are relatively strict, as are its ‘principles of 
engagement with government representatives’ which require, among other things, that 
lobbyists separate their professional lobbying work from any personal involvement in a 
political party. The draft code’s revolving door provisions are also relatively strict. 
Crikey.com had this to say: 
 
There is one area where the Government has gone much further than anticipated. 
The ban on ex-Ministers lobbying for 18 months after leaving offices has been 
extended to ministerial advisers, defence force officers at or above the rank of 
colonel, or equivalent, and Public Service SES officers, who will all be banned 
from lobbying for twelve months after ceasing their previous positions. The days of 
ADF officers and military procurement specialists going straight into the 
welcoming arms of defence contractors would appear to be over.51 
 
However other areas are more problematic. Enforcement of the code is left to the discretion 
of the Cabinet Secretary. There is no equivalent of a statutory regime of offences and 
penalties at work, oversighted by an independent authority. The absence of any spending 
disclosure provisions would also tend to place it closer to the category of ‘lowly regulated 
systems’, scoring only very modestly on the CPI quantitative index discussed previously.  
 
The same can be said of the proposal’s narrow definition of lobbyist, limited as this is to 
‘hired guns’ working on behalf of third party clients. The scheme does not apply to trade 
unions, industry associations, churches and charities. Three broad exclusions apply, set out 
by Warhurst as follows: 
 
The first involves charitable, religious and other organizations, whether or not in 
receipt of tax deductible status. The second involves all those who lobby on their 
own behalf. The third involves those, like lawyers and other professionals who only 
lobby occasionally and/or incidentally. 
 
As Warhurst comments: 
 
Third party lobbyists are only one element of the whole lobbying industry. They are 
technicians like lawyers and accountants who perform a fee for service. So a code 
of conduct that excludes many of the bigger players in the industry who lobby on 
their own behalf, like corporations, churches, unions and big national pressure 
groups like the Business Council of Australia, the Australian Medical Association, 
the Australian Conservation Foundation and so on, offers only very partial 
                                                 
50  For the full text see - 
http://lobbyists.pmc.gov.au/lobbyistsregister/index.cfm?event=contactWithLobbyistsCode 
51  ‘Why Faulkner’s lobbyist register won’t work’ - http://www.crikey.com.au/Politics/20080403-
Why-Faulkners-Lobbyist-Register-wont-work.html 
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coverage.52 
 
Crikey.com is equally critical, stating 
 
But the majority of lobbyists, the in-house representatives and government relations 
managers who push the interests of their own companies, will continue to ply their 
trade without needing to register. Surely the point of the register is to shed light on 
who is seeking to influence government, whether or not they are large enough to 
have their own government relations areas.  
 
The article continues: 
 
Peak industry bodies aren’t caught. Nor are representatives of non-profit bodies -- 
trade unions thus won’t be required to register. Nor will religious groups, as Bob 
Brown noted. "It should cover in-house lobbyists and other third-party 
organisations which seek to influence government legislation (like the Exclusive 
Brethren)," Brown told us. "And it should cover all MPs and senators, not just 
Government representatives." And one of the biggest gaps of all is the exemption 
for lawyers and accountants. Only if lobbying forms an undefined "significant" part 
of their activities will they be required to be registered.53  
 
Reacting to the release of the draft Lobbying Code of Conduct, the Australian Democrats 
Accountability Spokesperson Senator Andrew Murray stated:  
 
The Democrats are very pleased with this initiative. It is a significant and proactive 
integrity measure. I will be recommending that the Senate Finance and Public 
administration Committee report on the Draft.54  
 
On a more critical note, Senator Murray added: 
                                                 
52  J Warhurst, The Lobbying Code of Conduct: An Appraisal - 
http://democratic.audit.anu.edu.au/papers/20080415_warhurst_lobbying.pdf Under the draft 
code ‘lobbying are those activities that involve ‘communications with a Government 
representative in an effort to influence Government decision-making, including the making 
or amendment of legislation, the development or amendment of a Government policy or 
program, the awarding of a Government contact or the allocation of funding’. Warhurst 
observes that ‘The exclusions are again important and include activities associated with 
parliamentary committee work, the usual constituency work of parliamentarians, petitions 
and public statements and campaigns’. 
 
53  ‘Why Faulkner’s lobbyist register won’t work’ - http://www.crikey.com.au/Politics/20080403-
Why-Faulkners-Lobbyist-Register-wont-work.html 
54  On 14 May 2008 the Senate referred the Lobbying Code of Conduct to the Finance and 
Public Administration Committee for inquiry and report by the first sitting Thursday of August 
2008. - 
http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view_document.aspx?ID=112595&TABLE=JOURNALS
&TARGET= 
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There are at least two issues deserving further exploration: Is it comprehensive 
enough? Should it include those directly representing their own organisations, not 
just those representing third parties? Does Parliament need a parallel system, 
because lobbying is not just directed at government ministers and bureaucrats, but 
is also directed at those holding the balance of power, holding portfolios, and chairs 
and members of committees?"55 
 
Speaking on the ABC’s Lateline program Senator Murray explained: 
 
Legislation is decided by parliamentarians, it's not decided by the Government and 
therefore lobbying of those who hold the balance of power or backbench 
committees of any of that sort is a very important area for regulation.56 
 
On the other hand, by its definition of ‘government representative’ the code does extend 
beyond senior public servants and officials to all persons employed under the Public 
Service Act 1999 (Cth).57 It might be described as a bit of a mixed bag, therefore, relatively 
strong in some areas, requiring quarterly updates from lobbyists, for example, less so in 
others. 
 
A footnote to the debate is that Senator Faulkner is reported to have ruled out any 
possibility of Brian Burke’s inclusion on any proposed register of lobbyists, this despite his 
technical eligibility under the proposed guidelines.58 This Commonwealth register is 
reported to come into full effect on 1 July 2008.59 It will operate in conjunction with the 
Rudd Government’s Standards of Ministerial Ethics which, among other things, requires 
Ministers ‘to undertake that, on leaving office, they will not take personal advantage 
of information to which they have had access as a Minister, where that information 
is not generally available to the public’.60  
 
                                                 
55  Australian Democrats Press Release, Lobbying code of conduct: Senator Andre Murray, 2 
April 2008 - http://www.democrats.org.au/news/index.htm?press_id=6538 
56  ‘New draft conduct laws for professional lobbyists’, Lateline 15 April 2008 - 
http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2007/s2218081.htm 
57  For a commentary on the Code’s application to Commonwealth public servants see – 
Australian Government, Circular No 2008/4: requirements relating to the Lobbying Code of 
Conduct and post separation contact with government - 
http://www.apsc.gov.au/circulars/circular084.htm 
58  ‘Lobbyist code of conduct released’, The Age, 2 April 2008 - 
http://news.theage.com.au/lobbyist-code-of-conduct-released/20080402-237c.html  
59  As of 2 June 2008, there are 33 entries on the Register - 
http://lobbyists.pmc.gov.au/lobbyistsregister/index.cfm?event=whoIsOnRegister 
60  For the full text see - http://arts.anu.edu.au/democraticaudit/misc/RuddMinCodeConduct.pdf 
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6.2 Commonwealth – previous initiatives and proposals 
 
The Hawke Government initiative: In 1983-84 the Hawke Government introduced the 
Lobbyist Registration Scheme in reaction, it is said, ‘to the scandal generated by the 
connection between a lobbyist, the former national secretary of the Labor Party David 
Comber, and a Soviet diplomat Valery Ivanov’. In Warhurst’s opinion, ‘The requirements 
for lobbyists under this scheme were not onerous’ and the scheme served in fact to ‘give 
added legitimacy’ to the lobbying industry. He also claims that it was a ‘dead letter’ by the 
time it was abolished in 1996 by the incoming Howard Government.61 
 
Bob Brown’s Bill: On 14 June 2007 Greens Senator Bob Brown introduced a private 
member’s bill entitled the Lobbying and Ministerial Accountability Bill. The Second 
Reading Speech explained: 
 
To ensure lobbying activities are open and transparent, this bill will create a public 
register of lobbyists and regulate the industry. 
The bill will require: 
• all paid lobbyists to be registered and to lodge detailed information with the 
Commonwealth Public Service Commissioner; lobbyists to file a quarterly 
return of lobbying activity, with details about who they met and the purpose 
of the meeting;  
• the Public Service Commissioner to maintain a Register of Lobbying 
Activity that is open for public inspection in hard copy and on the internet;  
• penalties to apply for failure to abide by the lobbying laws and the 
Australian Crime Commission to investigate offences. 
 
With reference to the scope of the Bill, the Second Reading speech stated: 
 
Members of the public or those lobbying in a volunteer capacity will not be covered 
by the laws, but the definition of lobbyists is broadly drafted to cover law firms, 
public relations companies and former politicians as well as professional lobbyists. 
 
In effect, the Bill would have regulated ‘in-house’ or ‘employed’ lobbyists, as well as 
‘consultant’ lobbyists working on behalf of third parties. On the other hand, it did not 
exclude a natural person from lobbying on their own behalf.  
 
Lobbying activity was also broadly defined, as was the target of such activity. For this 
purposes the term ‘public official’ was defined to include Members of either House of 
Parliament. 
 
The Bill also included ‘revolving door provisions’ excluding Minister and Ministerial 
advisers from engaging in lobbying for a period of 2 years. This exclusion was made 
subject to certain exceptions, for examples, for acting on behalf of charities or political 
parties.62 
                                                 
61  J Warhurst, ‘Lobby world’ (April-May 2007) Arena Magazine13. 
62  For previous proposals at the Commonwealth level see – I Holland, Post-separation 
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The Bill lapsed upon the prorogation of the Commonwealth Parliament. 
 
6.3 South Australia  
 
Lobbying and Ministerial Accountability Bill 2007: In very similar terms to Senator’s 
Brown’s proposal is a Bill of the same name – the Lobbying and Ministerial Accountability 
Bill 2007 – which was introduced in the South Australian House of Assembly on 15 
November 2007 by the Independent RB Such. The Bill has not as yet passed its Second 
Reading stage. 
 
A feature of the Bill is that it regulates the lobbying of ‘senior public officials’, a term 
defined to include Minister and their advisors, all Members of Parliament, and senior 
public servants. A Code of Conduct would have to be observed by senior public officials 
when dealing with lobbyists. Further to the Bill, a register of lobbyists would be kept by the 
Auditor-General and, as with Senator Brown’s proposal, the investigation of offences 
would be undertaken by the Australian Crime Commission. The Bill’s ‘revolving door’ or 
post-separation employment provisions are also based on Senator Brown’s proposal. 
 
Post-separation employment: Post-separation employment rules are set out in Ministerial 
Code of Conduct of 2002, as follows: 
 
Ministers shall, within 14 days of the commencement of this Code (or within 14 
days of taking up office) provide a written undertaking to the Premier (or in the 
case of the Premier, Cabinet) that they will not, for a two year period after ceasing 
to be a Minister, take employment with, accept a directorship of or act as a 
consultant to any company, business or organization: 
a) with which they had official dealings as Minister in their last 12 months in 
office; and 
b) which: is in or in the process of negotiating a contractual relationship with the 
Government; or is in receipt of subsidies or benefits from the Government not 
received by a section of the community or the public; or has a government entity as 
a shareholder; or is in receipt of government loans, guarantees or other forms of 
capital assistance; or engages in conduct directly inconsistent with the policies and 
activities of the Minister -   without the prior written consent of the Commissioner 
for Public Employment in consultation with the Premier of the day.63 
                                                                                                                                               
employment for Ministers, Research Note No 40, 2001-02, Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Library. 
63  Government of South Australia, Ministerial Code of Conduct - 
http://www.premcab.sa.gov.au/pdf/Conduct_2002.pdf In Queensland, the Ministers Code of 
Ethics, which is at Appendix 19 to the Ministerial Handbook, provides that Ministers will 
‘undertake not to take personal advantage, in any future employment, of information 
obtained as a Minister which is not publicly available, including confidential information on 
pending contracts or dealings. This does not apply to statutory appointments, nor does it 
apply to information that a Minister may have of another Minister’s department which is not 
confidential.’ 
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6.4 Western Australia  
 
Contact with Lobbyists Code: The draft Lobbying Code of Conduct released by the 
Commonwealth Government in April 2008 is based to a significant extent on the Contact 
with Lobbyists Code established in Western Australia in 2006.64  
 
Lobbyists are defined in a similarly restrictive way to include only ‘hired guns’ working on 
behalf of third parties. These must place their details on a quarterly basis on a Register of 
Lobbyists, which is open to public view on the Internet. As at 9 May 2008 there are 76 
entries on the Register.65 The Register is administered by the Director General of the 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet who may refuse to accept an application at his 
discretion, or similarly remove a lobbyists from the Register at his discretion where, for 
example, the lobbyist has contravened the terms of the Contact with Lobbyists Code. 
 
Post-separation employment: Post-separation employment rules are set out in the 
Ministerial Code of Conduct of August 2006, as follows: 
 
Ministers leaving government should exercise care in taking up employment or 
business activities in the period immediately after leaving government. In 
particular, they should take care in accepting offers of employment from bodies: 
 
• which are in a contractual relationship with the State Government; 
• which are in receipt of subsidies or benefits from the Government not 
received by a section of the community or the community at large; 
• in which the Government is a shareholder; 
• which are in receipt of government loans, guarantees or other forms of 
capital assistance; or 
• with which the departments or branches of government are, as a matter of 
course, in a special relationship. 
 
In all areas, confidential information gained during office must not be used and care 
should be taken to ensure that preferential treatment for the new employer or the 
business is not obtained by the use of contacts and personal influence by the former 
Minister.66 
 
                                                 
64  The full text of that Code can be accessed at - 
https://secure.dpc.wa.gov.au/lobbyistsregister/index.cfm?event=contactWithLobbyistsCode 
65  This can be accessed at - 
https://secure.dpc.wa.gov.au/lobbyistsregister/index.cfm?event=whoIsOnRegister 
66  Government of Western Australia, Ministerial Code of Conduct  - 
http://www.premier.wa.gov.au/docs/accountability/ministerial_code_of_conduct.pdf 
NSW Parliamentary Library Research Service 
 
32
6.5 New South Wales 
 
ICAC and lobbying: In one way or another and at differing levels the issue of lobbying 
has been around in NSW politics for many years. The ICAC, in particular, has taken note 
of lobbying and its attendant issues. As far back as 1990 in its Report on North Coast Land 
Development the ICAC considered that lobbying could easily lead to corruption and 
recommended the establishment of a public register of lobbyists, and perhaps their clients. 
The report concluded a register could provide a sound basis for regulation of lobbying 
activities, by legislation or self-regulation. This recommendation was reiterated in the 1998 
report Strategies for Managing Post Separation Employment where it was stated 
 
In the absence of laws in NSW to deal with influence from former public officials, 
public sector organisations need to take responsibility for minimising the possibility 
that former public officials will attempt to influence government decision making. 
The ICAC maintains that there should be a register of political lobbyists in NSW, 
as recommended in its 1990 report Investigation into North Coast Land 
Development.67 
 
Returning again to the issue in 2005, in its Report on investigation into planning decisions 
relating to the Orange Grove Centre the ICAC recommended 
 
That the NSW Government amend the Ministerial Code of Conduct to include 
guidelines about lobbying activities. The guidelines should address issues such as 
transparency, equality of access and ethical conduct in relation to lobbying.68 
 
Ministerial guidelines and lobbyists: In 2006 the NSW Premier’s Department issued 
guidelines for Ministers, their staff and public officials in dealing with lobbyists. These 
guidelines only apply where lobbying occurs in respect of a decision that is proposed to be 
made further to legislation (a statutory decision), where the decision-maker is required to 
adhere to the principles of administrative law. However, they do apply ‘to all Ministers, 
ministerial staff and public officials who are lobbied in respect of a proposed statutory 
decision’.69 The lobbying activity covered by the guidelines relates to 
 
lobbying by any person, including principals seeking or resisting the making of the 
proposed statutory decision, special interest groups, professional advocates, 
Members of Parliament and any other person. 
 
                                                 
67  ICAC, Strategies for Managing Post Separation Employment - 
http://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/files/pdf/pub2_32cp1.pdf 
68  ICAC, Report on investigation into planning decisions relating to the Orange Grove Centre, 
p 102- http://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/files/pdf/pub2_99i.pdf 
69  It is added: ‘They apply where the person who is lobbied is the actual decision-maker as 
well as in those cases where the person who is lobbied is not the decision-maker and 
another Minister or public official is responsible for making the decision’. 
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It is further stated that: 
 
While the principles set out in these Guidelines are not required to be complied 
with where lobbying occurs on other issues (such as lobbying which occurs in 
relation to legislative changes), the principles may still provide some useful 
guidance. 
 
The guidelines then set out the following ‘principles to be observed’: 
 
Ministers, ministerial staff and public officials should ensure that lobbying in relation 
to a statutory decision: 
(a) is undertaken in accordance with appropriate practices; and 
(b) does not undermine the integrity of decision-making processes. 
In some cases, it might even be wise for Ministers, ministerial staff and public officials 
to consider taking such reasonable steps as are available to them to try to ensure that 
lobbying does not occur at all while the proposed statutory decision is being made. 
 
The guidelines add: 
 
In particular, Ministers, ministerial staff and public officials who are lobbied should: 
(i) be alert to the motives and interests of those who seek to lobby in relation to a 
statutory decision  
(ii) be aware of which person, organisation or company a lobbyist is representing; 
(iii) ensure that the making of a statutory decision is not prejudiced by the giving of 
undertakings to an interested party prior to the decision-maker considering all 
relevant information; 
(iv) avoid doing or saying anything which could be viewed as granting a lobbyist 
preferential treatment; 
(v) ensure as a decision-maker that, as far as possible, competing parties are treated 
fairly and consistently - for example, it may be necessary to provide a group with 
an opportunity to make submissions in relation to a proposed decision in 
circumstances where another group with a different view has been afforded an 
opportunity to make representations on the proposed decision; 
(vi) ensure that confidential information is not disclosed to a lobbyist; 
(vii) be alert to attempts by lobbyists to encourage decision-makers to consider 
matters which are extraneous or irrelevant to the merits of the decision under 
consideration; 
(viii) consider keeping records of meetings with lobbyists, and if necessary having 
another person attend the meeting as a witness or to take notes; and 
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(ix) ensure that no action is taken which involves a breach of a relevant code of 
conduct (such as the Ministerial Code of Conduct), for example, by accepting 
inappropriate hospitality or gifts from lobbyists.70 
 
A second arm to the regulation of lobbyists in NSW is in the form of a protocol for the 
management of corruption allegations made to Ministers, their staff or public officials 
during lobbying. Such allegations are to be dealt with by the appropriate agency head and, 
where a duty to notify possible corrupt conduct arises, the matter is to be referred to the 
ICAC. 
 
In 2007 the NSW Premier, Morris Iemma, rejected the need for a register for lobbyists, 
arguing that not all organisations and individual lobbyists would be covered. As Warhurst 
says, the Premier ‘prefers to rely on ministerial guidelines introduced in 2006 to deal with 
lobbyists and on the general oversight of the Independent Commission against 
Corruption’.71 
 
Parliamentary register of lobbyists: Since 1996 NSW the Parliament has operated a 
register of lobbyists but only for the specific purpose of allowing registered lobbyists 
access to some non-public areas in the Parliamentary precincts, such as the Parliamentary 
Library.72 
 
As the President of the Legislative Council explained to an Upper House Estimates 
Committee on 19 October 2007: 
 
I am advised that lobbyists are administered by Parliamentary Security Services. 
Lobbyists’ passes only provide access to restricted areas of the building and one 
copy of any bill or legislation that is requested. There is no special access to 
Ministers or public officers provided to lobbyists. Nor are there any special 
privileges. We are currently reviewing the lobbyist policy to consider if there are 
any changes necessary. 
 
6.6 Post-separation employment rules in NSW 
 
ICAC and post-separation employment rules: A particular issue of interest to the ICAC 
has been the formulation of post-separation employment rules for Ministers. According to 
the ICAC: 
 
The purpose of post-separation employment rules for Ministers is twofold. Firstly, 
they are intended to reassure the public that Ministers are not taking unfair 
                                                 
70  NSW Premier’s Department - 
http://www.dpc.nsw.gov.au/publications/memos_and_circulars/ministerial_memoranda/2006
/m2006-01 
71  Warhurst, n 1, p 66. 
72  RD Grove and M Swinson eds, NSW Legislative Assembly Practice, Procedure and 
Privilege, 2007, p 219. 
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advantage of their public office positions. Secondly, they provide guidance to 
Ministers in making decisions about their future careers which are inevitably 
subject to public scrutiny and possible criticism.73 
 
Suggested in the 1997 discussion paper Managing Post Separation Employment was the 
introduction of ‘cooling-off periods’, with the ICAC commenting: 
 
A cooling off period for former public officials, during which time they could not 
approach their former employer on matters in which they were personally and 
substantially involved, has been used successfully in other countries. It would lessen 
the likelihood that public administration would be compromised by influence. As the 
purpose of cooling off periods is to remove any personal advantage the former public 
official has gained over others, rather than to restrain trade, they would need to be 
limited in time.  
 
The ICAC Discussion Paper continued: 
 
While it might be sufficient to limit contact by former senior public servants to their 
former Department or agency, for higher profile public officials such as Members 
of Parliament and Ministers, whose knowledge of government programs and 
influence is likely to be greater, broader restrictions may be appropriate.74 
 
The ICAC had further cause to consider post-separation employment rules for Ministers in 
its June 2004 Report on investigation into conduct of the Hon J Richard Face. There the 
ICAC investigated an allegation that Face had, in early 2003, used both his electorate and 
ministerial office staff for purposes not connected with his parliamentary duties, in 
particular to assist him to establish a consultancy business which he proposed to operate 
after his retirement from Parliament. In 1995 Face became Minister for Gaming and Racing 
and Minister Assisting the Premier on Hunter Development, portfolios he held until his 
resignation as a Minister on 12 February 2003. As the ICAC reported: 
 
The nature of his new career was to be a consultancy in the area of licensing, 
racing, gaming and “Hunter development”. Mr Face said in his evidence to the 
Commission that he could see nothing wrong with what he had done.75 
 
After considering post-separation models in other jurisdictions, including options for codes 
of conduct or specific legislation, the ICAC recommended:76 
                                                 
73  ICAC, Report on investigation into conduct of the Hon J Richard Face, June 2004, p 78. 
74  ICAC, Managing Post Separation Employment: Discussion Paper, April 1997 - 
http://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/files/pdf/pub2_25cp1.pdf 
75  ICAC,n 73, p 69. 
76  The report looked at models of regulation in Australia based on codes of conduct 
(Queensland, Western Australia and South Australia), the UK model and the legislative 
approach adopted in the US. 
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That the Government introduce rules to restrict the range of employment that 
Ministers can take up immediately after leaving office. 
 
Further recommendations were made for the Government to consider in developing these 
rules, as follows: 
 
(a) including an explicit statement in the Ministerial code of conduct which 
highlights the ethical issues raised by post-separation employment of Ministers; 
(b) establishing a process (such as an advisory committee) for approving, or 
advising Ministers on, offers of employment or business associations received by 
them before and after leaving office; 
(c) requiring that while in office Ministers must obtain advice in relation to any 
offers of employment or business associations received which directly relate to 
their portfolio responsibilities; 
(d) providing an option for former Ministers to seek and obtain advice in relation to 
offers of employment or business associations received after leaving office; 
(e) requiring that Ministers must, while in office and for a specified period after 
leaving office, obtain approval to take up offers of employment or business 
associations which directly relate to their portfolio responsibilities; 
(f) requiring that for a specified period after leaving office Ministers may not take 
up appointments in areas of activity specified in the rules – such as the portfolio 
areas for which they were responsible during the last year before they left office; 
(g) requiring that for a specified period after leaving office Ministers may not, for 
purposes of personal commercial advantage, have contact with employees of 
departments for which they were responsible during their last year in office [any 
such requirement should not preclude the level or nature of contact available to all 
members of the general public]; 
(h) establishing a method of appropriately enforcing the rules imposed. 
 
On this last issue of enforcement the ICAC had commented: 
 
In considering the options for a policy of restricting post-ministerial employment, 
the issue of enforceability must be considered. A statement in a code of conduct is 
not likely to be sufficient in itself to deter unwanted behaviour. Furthermore, 
regulation by government is often regarded with suspicion by the public. In order to 
ensure probity in post-ministerial appointments, and public confidence in the 
regulatory process, it is essential that any such policy is both effective and 
enforceable.77 
 
Post-separation guidelines and the Parliamentary Ethics Adviser: Responding to the 
ICAC’s recommendations, on 28 March 2006 the Premier announced that the Ministerial 
Code of Conduct would be amended, along lines based on the UK model it was said, to 
provide that 
 
                                                 
77  ICAC, n 73, p 78. 
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former Ministers must, during the first 12 months of leaving office, obtain written 
advice from the Parliamentary Ethics Adviser before accepting any employment or 
engagement, or providing services to third parties. This obligation will apply where 
the proposed employment relates to portfolio responsibilities held during the last 
two years of ministerial office. A similar obligation will apply to current Ministers 
who, while still in office, are planning post-separation employment or businesses. 
 
Premier Iemma continued:  
 
The adviser will be required to express his view as to whether the acceptance of the 
position could give rise to a reasonable concern that the Minister's conduct while in 
office was influenced by the prospect of future employment or engagement, or that 
the Minister might make improper use of confidential information to which he or 
she had access. The ethics adviser may advise that a position should not be taken, 
or should be taken subject only to certain conditions. It will, of course, be a matter 
for former Ministers to decide whether or not they accept that advice, but if they 
accept the position regardless, the ethics adviser will forward his advice to the 
Presiding Officer of the relevant House. 
 
No express sanctions or enforcement provisions were established therefore, with the 
Premier commenting in this respect: 
 
A former Minister would be unlikely to run the risk of damaging his or her 
reputation by acting against the advice of the independent ethics adviser.78 
 
Following the Premier’s announcement, in October 2006 an amended Code of Conduct for 
Ministers of the Crown was tabled, providing at section 7.4 that: 
 
Ministers who, while in office, are considering an offer of post-separation 
employment or an engagement or who are proposing to provide services after they 
leave office to third parties (including establishing a business to provide such 
services) must obtain advice from the Parliamentary Ethics Adviser before 
accepting any employment or engagement or providing services to third parties 
which relates or relate to their portfolio responsibilities (including portfolio 
responsibilities held during the previous two years of Ministerial office). 
 
And at section 7.5 that: 
 
Former Ministers must also obtain advice from the Parliamentary Ethics Adviser 
before accepting any employment or engagement or providing services to third 
parties (including establishing a business to provide such services) within the first 
12 months of leaving Ministerial office, which relates or relate to their former 
portfolio responsibilities during the last two years in which they held Ministerial 
                                                 
78  NSWPD (LA), 28 March 2006, p 21542. For a commentary on the background to these 
reforms and on the UK model see – NSW Parliament, Legislative Assembly, Standing 
Committee on Parliamentary Privilege and Ethics, Post Separation Guidelines – Meeting 
with the Parliamentary Ethics Adviser, November 2006. 
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office. This requirement does not apply to any employment or engagement by the 
Government. (emphasis added)79 
 
Further to this, the functions of the Parliamentary Ethics Adviser were extended to include 
the provision of advice to Ministers or former Members who held ministerial positions in 
relation to post-separation employment.80 Advice can be requested either by serving 
Ministers or a person who held a ministerial office within the last 12 months. The advice 
relates to whether: (a) an offer of post-separation employment has been made which relates 
to the Minister or former Minister’s portfolio responsibilities held over the previous two 
years, or (b) a decision to work as a consultant lobbyist for third parties would give rise to 
reasonable concern that:  
 
• the Minister’s (or former Minister’s) conduct while in office was influenced by the 
prospect of the employment or engagement or the proposal to provide services; or  
• the Minister (or former Minister) might make improper use of confidential information 
to which he or she has access while in office.81  
 
In applying these rules, the terms of reference provide that: 
 
If the Adviser is of the opinion that accepting the proposed employment or 
engagement or proceeding with the proposal to provide services might give rise to 
such a reasonable concern, but the concern would not arise if the employment or 
engagement or the provision of services were subject to certain conditions, then he 
or she must so advise and specify the necessary conditions. 
 
The Ethics Adviser is empowered therefore to advise that employment may be accepted or 
lobbying services performed subject to appropriate conditions. He is required to keep 
records of advice given and of factual information on which the advice was based. This 
advice is normally to remain confidential.82  
 
Further, provision is also made for the Ethics Adviser to report to Parliament annually on 
the statistical details of the number of Members who sought advice and other matters.83 
                                                 
79  It seems therefore that former Ministers can take up governmental appointments 
immediately upon resigning from Parliament. 
80  For the current resolution setting out the functions of the Ethics Adviser see – Grove and 
Swinson eds, n 72, pp 55-57. 
81  NSW Parliamentary Ethics Adviser, Terms of Reference - 
http://bulletin/prod/corp/policies.nsf/0c023ed434633799ca256eec00299c6d/c535bf5e6f5a2e
68ca2573640000a75e!OpenDocument 
82  Unless it is made public with the permission of the Member concerned, or where either 
House of Parliament calls for the production of the records in circumstances where the 
Member concerned has sought to ‘rely on the advice of the Parliamentary Ethics Adviser; or 
given permission for the records to be produced to the House’. 
83  But note that the last Annual Report of the Ethics Adviser is dated 2005. 
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However, no system is in place, comparable to that in the UK, for lists of appointments 
taken up by Ministers to be posted on a publicly available website, updated on a monthly 
basis.  
 
Comment: As the Ethics Adviser has not reported to Parliament since the introduction of 
these new functions, it is impossible to say how well these post-separation employment 
rules are working, if at all. For obvious reasons, the system in place in NSW at present 
would be classified as weakly regulated in terms of transparency and enforceability.  
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7. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
The academic literature on lobbying suggests a number of things. One is that no regulatory 
system is a panacea and that some way of undermining established rules would always be 
found. Nonetheless, it is also suggested that more highly regulated schemes are more likely 
to ensure accountability in government. At least, that is said to be the perception of those 
actors or participants in the political systems under study.  
 
As we have seen from the foregoing account, the regulatory system in NSW is quite 
rudimentary. It is based not on legislation as in Canada and the US, but on a Code of 
Practice which applies only to Ministers, the enforceability of which is left up to the ICAC, 
if and when questions of possible corruption are brought out into the open.  
 
By way of contrast, the US States and the Federal Government have made concerted efforts 
to bring accountability and transparency to the practice of lobbying. The same is true in 
Canada federally and in several of the Provinces. Imperfect as they may be, these systems 
place statutory requirements on lobbyists to register and provide a considerable amount of 
detail about their practices. Enforcement mechanisms are in place, as are penalties for 
failure to satisfy the statutory requirements. Post-separation employment rules, prohibiting 
Ministers and others from engaging in specific or general forms of lobbying for defined 
periods, also find legislative expression. 
 
In Australia, only in Western Australia in 2006 and more recently at the Commonwealth 
level have moves been made to establish a register for lobbyists. As discussed, these 
schemes are somewhat limited by US and Canadian standards, for example, defining 
lobbyists narrowly to cover only ‘hired guns’ or consultant lobbyists contracted by third 
parties to act on their behalf. In terms of the ‘ideal types’ considered in this paper, the new 
Commonwealth scheme can be said to belong to either the category of ‘lowly regulated’ or 
‘medium regulated systems’. However, it is fair to say that in some areas it is relatively 
strict, including that of post-separation employment rules and the requirement for quarterly 
updates from lobbyists.  
 
On one view, the Commonwealth Lobbying Code of Conduct, which comes into force on 1 
July 2008, is a step in the right direction. Then again, an argument can be made that it deals 
with the more obviously problematic aspects of lobbying practice, those that give rise to 
most public concern. By targeting consultant lobbyists working on behalf of third parties, it 
seeks to address concerns about the undue influence such professional lobbyists are said to 
have in the small world of Australian politics, where the accumulated links between these 
‘hired guns’ and the decision-makers can sometimes seem uncomfortably close. Similarly, 
by establishing a ‘cooling-off’ period for Ministers, senior public servants and others 
before they are able to undertake lobbying activities the Code addresses the ‘conveyor belt’ 
perception that public service has become a means to achieving the goals of private 
interest. 
 
It is not to say that the regulation of lobbyists could not go further, to extend to ‘in-house’ 
lobbyists, for instance, or to include communications seeking to influence all 
parliamentarians, irrespective of whether they hold an executive position. Both these 
matters are currently the subject of inquiry by the Senate’s Finance and Public 
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Administration Committee, established to consider generally whether the Lobbying Code of 
Conduct ‘is adequate to achieve its aims’.  
 
Many issues arise, particularly in respect to extending the regulatory system to cover all 
parliamentarians. What problem would such regulation seek to address? In normal 
circumstances, an individual member of the major parties, where strict discipline applies, 
would not be influenced by a lobbyist to vote one way or another on legislation, or indeed 
on any other matter that was the subject of a parliamentary vote. Presumably, if the 
question of influence were to arise it would do so at an earlier stage, where a Member 
spoke for or against an issue or a measure in Caucus or in some other party forum. The 
situation for members of minor parties and independents may be somewhat different, 
particularly where they hold the balance of power. These are the kinds of issues the Senate 
Committee will need to consider. Arguments on behalf of transparency and accountability 
must be given due weight, but so too must those considerations founded on the 
requirements of representative democracy, for constituents to communicate freely with 
Members of Parliament, and for Members of Parliament to talk to and meet as wide a range 
of people as possible. The extent to which overseas practice offers meaningful guidance 
and comparison is another question to be answered, bearing in mind that party discipline 
may not always be as rigidly applied in other jurisdictions as it is in Australia. The outcome 
of the UK’s Public Administration Select Committee inquiry into lobbying would be an 
interesting point of comparison in this and other respects.  
 
It may be that the case for regulating ‘in-house’ lobbyists, working on behalf of 
corporations and other organisations, including charities, religious groups and trade unions 
is more straightforward. Again, the relevant issues are sure to be canvassed by the Senate’s 
Finance and Public Administration Committee. It may also be the case that, in the wake of 
these developments at the Commonwealth level, these and other issues concerning 
lobbying await further consideration in NSW. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY 
 
US STATE LOBBYING TOTALS, 2004-06 
 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/hiredguns/chart.aspx?act=lobbyspending 
  
   
 
State 2004 Expenditure 
2005 
Expenditure
2006 
Expenditure
Lobbyists 
Registered 
In 2004 
Lobbyist 
Employers 
In 2006 
Notes 
Alabama No Total  No Total No Total 603 693  
Alaska 14,632,079  16,750,773 26,272,631 342 630  
Arizona* 3,082,229  2,941,947 2,602,866 800 1291 Compensation/salary is only reported for lobbyists employed by 
public bodies. No compensation/salary is reported for other 
lobbyists. The total number of lobbyists represents primary and 
paid lobbyists, but the state counts an additional 2,800 
lobbyists.  
Arkansas No Total  No Total No Total 452 537  
California 212,695,872  227,940,496 271,680,365 1267 3201 Spending totals include only amounts filed electronically.  
Colorado 20,888,314  22,112,714 24,396,668 670 2325 The annual filing period is July 1 through June 30. The 2004 
and 2005 total have been updated.  
Connecticut 27,626,998  No Total 38,419,882 635 928  
Delaware* 161,855  128,783 136,200 270 568  
Florida 3,858,165  4,025,430 121,760,708 2029 3238 Due to change in reporting law, the 2006 total includes 
compensation for the first time, but expenditures are no longer 
required to be reported. Legislative and executive branch 
lobbyists register with different offices; lobbyist and employer 
numbers cover legislative branch only.  
Georgia* 946,814  1,203,531 1,202,269 1506 5646  
Hawaii 3,749,862  4,470,088 4,413,155 312 336 Spending totals do not include executive branch lobbyists.    
   
State 2004 Expenditure 
2005 
Expenditure
2006 
Expenditure
Lobbyists 
Registered 
In 2004 
Lobbyist 
Employers 
In 2006 
Notes 
Idaho* 487,341  506,767 869,664 392 488  
Illinois* 1,004,437  1,345,413 1,279,213 2195 1731  
Indiana 12,115,413  25,166,589 21,999,739 684 648 The annual reporting period is November 1 through October 
31. Legislative and executive branch lobbyists register with 
different offices; lobbyist and employer numbers cover 
legislative branch only. The 2006 spending total includes $3.7 
million in compensation reported by executive branch lobbyists 
for calendar year 2006. Because it was the first year of required 
disclosure for executive branch lobbyists, it is possible there is 
some overlap between lobbyists reporting compensation earned 
for both legislative and executive branch lobbying.  
Iowa 8,297,108  9,134,939 7,802,064 849 1085 The spending totals do not include legislative branch lobbyists. 
Legislative and executive branch lobbyists register with 
different offices; lobbyist and employer numbers cover 
legislative branch only.  
Kansas* 593,974  560,395 938,745 560 1376 Spending totals do not include executive branch lobbyists.    
Kentucky 11,869,843  11,672,726 14,424,699 653 622 Legislative and executive branch lobbyists register with 
different offices; lobbyist and employer numbers cover the 
legislative branch only. Executive branch lobbyists' salaries are 
not included.    
Louisiana* 535,325  561,390 1,113,298 531 1254 Spending totals do not include executive branch lobbyists.  
Maine 3,524,421  4,426,014 3,227,761 279 324 Spending totals do not include executive branch lobbyists.  
Maryland 38,556,789  34,798,229 37,085,356 637 1086 The annual filing period is November 1 through October 31.  
   
State 2004 Expenditure 
2005 
Expenditure
2006 
Expenditure
Lobbyists 
Registered 
In 2004 
Lobbyist 
Employers 
In 2006 
Notes 
Massachusetts 31,052,702  70,955,161 78,960,743 569 1052  
Michigan 27,161,810  29,544,777 22,692,687 1283 1222  
Minnesota 50,217,111  54,718,363 53,287,186 1385 1261 The agency rounds report totals to the nearest $20,000. 
Spending totals include local lobby spending, as well as 
legislative and executive lobby spending.    
Mississippi 13,586,918  13,834,059 17,697,439 422 565  
Missouri* 1,085,545  1,074,587 1,074,258 1116 1865  
Montana 6,039,657  5,457,284 6,924,175 536 452  
Nebraska 8,574,933  9,780,800 9,993,827 345 696 Spending totals do not include executive branch lobbyists.  
Nevada* No Total  161,568 No Total -1 -1 Lobbyists are only required to register and report during 
legislative sessions, which are held in odd-numbered years.    
New 
Hampshire 
No Total  No Total No Total 227 441  
New Jersey 25,126,328  28,922,559 55,321,166 935 1834  
New Mexico No Total  No Total No Total 855 907 Lobbyist and employer numbers were generated from 2007 
lists.  
New York 144,000,000  149,000,000 151,000,000 5117 3347 Totals include local lobby spending, as well as legislative and 
executive lobby spending.    
North 
Carolina 
8,804,927  15,620,669 14,146,337 726 819 The Secretary of State provided a 2005 spending total after the 
date of publication of that story in 2006.  
   
State 2004 Expenditure 
2005 
Expenditure
2006 
Expenditure
Lobbyists 
Registered 
In 2004 
Lobbyist 
Employers 
In 2006 
Notes 
North Dakota* 3,141  23,338 1,875 154 302 Spending totals do not include executive branch lobbyists. The 
annual reporting period is July 1 through June 30.  
Ohio* 394,146  599,498 349,417 1401 1334 Legislative and executive branch lobbyists register with 
different offices; lobbyist and employer numbers cover 
legislative branch only.  
Oklahoma* 125,000  175,780 161,652 362 700  
Oregon 14,263,277  24,381,727 16,148,614 629 640  
Pennsylvania No Total  124,813,732 54,090,812 355 1148 Lobbyist and employer numbers reflect registration with the 
state Senate.    
Rhode Island No Total  No Total No Total 201 476  
South 
Carolina^ 
14,808,403  16,643,462 19,815,024 385 568  
South Dakota No Total  No Total No Total 625 393  
Tennessee*^ 245,180  136,571 10,000 512 726 The annual reporting period is October 1 through September 
30. Lobbyists were required to report campaign contributions, 
but not expenses or salaries. A new ethics bill prohibited 
lobbyists from making contributions to candidates for Governor 
and legislature so the amount dropped significantly. Lobbyists 
began reporting more information to the Tennessee Ethics 
Commission starting October 1, 2006.  
Texas 162,111,407  173,594,357 120,215,500 1489 2730 Lobbyists report their salary as a range; the figure at the low 
end of the range was used to calculate spending totals for this 
   
State 2004 Expenditure 
2005 
Expenditure
2006 
Expenditure
Lobbyists 
Registered 
In 2004 
Lobbyist 
Employers 
In 2006 
Notes 
analysis.    
Utah* 145,246  134,432 228,668 351 423 Employer number was generated from a 2007 list.  
Vermont 5,438,045  6,181,442 5,943,594 425 400  
Virginia 13,824,820  13,150,991 15,367,800 987 917 The annual filing period is May 1 through April 30.    
Washington 34,996,252  37,049,691 38,717,055 964 1265  
West 
Virginia*^ 
311,519  217,515 329,267 458 531  
Wisconsin 22,518,763  31,200,000 26,826,964 815 755  
Wyoming* 175,103  200,238 159,325 365 321 The annual filing period from May 1 through April 30.  
*Total does not include lobbyist salaries/compensation 
^Total may include campaign contributions/political donations from lobbyists to candidates 
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